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PREFACE 
 
 
 This project is the culmination of my efforts to understand Hindu-Muslim relations in the 
twentieth century. My thesis revolves around a paradox surrounding the Kanpur Riots, the major 
finding of my research last year. After reading about the “carnage at Kanpur” in The 
Construction of Communalism in North India in the February of last year, I was inspired to learn 
more about the 1931 Kanpur riots.
1
 My efforts to find a secondary source recounting the riots, 
however, were fruitless. While surveys of modern India mentioned the violence at Kanpur, no 
single monograph detailing the riots existed. Instead, scholars wrote about the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report, a Congress Party authored Report that recounted the riots and included a 
293-page history describing Hindu-Muslim relations.  
 My research at the National Archives of India (NAI) and the Nehru Memorial Museum 
and Library (NMML) in New Delhi from August 3-September 3, 2007 fine-tuned this paradox. 
The newspapers I consulted at NMML, The Leader and The Statesman, focused on the atrocities 
committed and the ineffectiveness of police forces to quell the riots. Similarly, the testimonies of 
British officials involved in the riots that I examined in the National Archives evidenced how 
official (British) inaction was the notable feature of the Kanpur Riots. Yet, secondary sources 
that included brief references to the Kanpur Riots attributed its significance not to official 
inaction or the brutality of the violence but the literary consequences of the riots, the Kanpur 
Riot Commission Report. This thesis will explore the Report and the context in which it was 
written. 
 Because only two competing narratives of the 1931 Kanpur riots exist, the British 
Commission Report and the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, the essential challenge of my 
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v 
work has been to substantiate claims about the 1931 Kanpur Riots using limited primary sources. 
I have sought, wherever it was possible, to corroborate claims made in British testimonies and in 
the periodicals, The Leader and The Statesman, with evidence presented in other primary 
documents. In short, my efforts have been to put the nationalist version of events in dialogue 
with the official (British) account.  
While the aforementioned primary documents are the basis of the second and third 
chapters, they do not comprise the totality of my research. The final body of sources I examined 
were nationalist histories written between the 1930s until today. These histories are termed 
nationalist because they were written in opposition to colonial histories, authored by British 
historians and carrying an imperialistic ideological bias. Nationalist histories are a reaction to 
this type of history and focus on depicting Indians as part of groups that would naturally be 
identified as Indian.
2
 These histories provide a framework for how nationalists viewed their past 
and of special note is their treatment of communalism, one of the most highly charged words of 
Indian histories. “Communalism” was a term coined by the British to exclusively describe 
religious relations in India. Because a plethora of books deal with communalism, I have 
depended on the guidance of my thesis advisor to direct me to the most notable tracts on the 
subject. His help has been invaluable. Together, the sources I have compiled provide insight into 
the daily events of the Kanpur riots while placing the riot into a wider framework of how 
nationalists remember and write about sectarian strife.  
 I have engaged in this project for a year and a half and in coming to its conclusion, I 
would like to express my gratitude for all the help I received. A travel grant from the Center for 
the Advanced Study of India allowed me to spend one month in India while additional funds 
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v 
from the Benjamin Franklin Scholars Program, the Penn Humanities Forum, the College Alumni 
Society Board of Managers and Presidents, and the History Department defrayed research 
expenses. I am additionally grateful to a number of people, all of whom I wish to acknowledge 
here. I want to thank Dr. David Nelson, the South Asia bibliographer for helping me track down 
a variety of sources and always being available to answer last minute queries. Daniel Crowley 
deserves my thanks for editing the draft version of this thesis as do my fellow thesis writers who 
inspired me with their own works and passion for history. I want to express my gratitude to Dr. 
Kristen Stromberg for providing endless support during the last year and a half. Finally, I wish to 
thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Ramnarayan Rawat, for pushing me to test my limits as a historian 
and becoming my mentor in the process. 
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“And what havoc have we done! Women insulted! Children done to death! Let no 
Hindu comfort himself with the thought that they were Musalman [Muslim] 
children: let no Musalman feel happy in the knowledge that it is Hindu children 
who have been killed. I do not know their religion. Let it be recognized that both 
Hindus and Musalmans had lost their senses. They were all children of the soil, 
children of the common Motherland.”
3
 
 Mahatma Gandhi, Young India, April 2, 1931 
 
The Birth of a Report 
 The Kanpur Riots resulted in the deaths of over 400 people and left a city devastated. In 
six days, from March 24
th
 to March 30
th 
1931, eighteen mosques were burnt, forty-two temples 
plundered and over 250 houses damaged.
4
 Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi, the President of the United 
Provinces Provincial Congress Committee, died attempting to protect Hindus from a Muslim 
mob, and in every mohalla (neighborhood) of the city, stories emerged of the brutal atrocities 
that had taken place. The aftermath of the riot saw the Governor in Council of the province 
dismiss District Magistrate, J.F Sale, the highest British civil servant in Kanpur, and charges of 
official (British) inaction during the riots coupled with the mismanagement of police forces 
became front-page news. The riots, in 1931, conjured up “scenes of devastation,” that The 
Leader, an Indian newspaper with a pro-Congress Party slant, daily depicted in April editions of 
the newspaper.
5
    
                                                 
3
 M.K. Gandhi, “Cawnpore and its Lesson.” Young India XIII, no. 14 (1931): 6. 
4
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2 
 What is remembered now of the Kanpur Riots, however, is that in its aftermath, a small 
group of prominent Congress Party members wrote a report about what had happened. 
Paralleling the British investigation into the causes and course of the riot, Purushottam Das 
Tandon, Khwaja Abdul Majid, T. A. K. Sherwani, Zaraful-Mulk, Pandit Sunderlal and Bhagwan 
Das crafted the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. All six authors were well-known members of 
the All-India Congress Committee and were involved in the United Provinces Congress 
Committees. Beginning on April 11
th
, ten days after the riots had ceased, they began “sittings, for 
recording evidence in a couple of rooms kindly placed at the disposal of the Committee by the 
authorities of the Gaya Prasad Library.”
6
 Bhagwan Das recollected: 
  From the 12
th
 onwards, some members of the Committee used to go round daily for local 
 inspections, spending about four hours each day in this work, recording notes of what 
 they saw and heard, also addressing small gatherings on the need for and the way of 
 harmony and peace. In the afternoons, they sat in the Gaya Prasad Library from 3 p.m. till 
 8, 9, sometimes 10 p.m., recording evidences.
7
  
 
Their work in Kanpur lasted until May 25
th
 when, after completing the interviews, they shifted to 
Benares where they remained for the next 109 days until September 19
th
.
8
  
 As the authors began to make sense of the Kanpur riots, what had initially began as an 
investigation into riot events evolved into a “historical retrospect covering the Muslim and the 
British periods…intended to show the development of the social and political forces which 
[were] responsible for the present situation.”
9
  The expanded scope of the project justified the 
“nearly two months of collection of evidence and three months of writing” that Das explained 
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9
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3 
could not be “grudged in a matter of such vital consequences.”
10
 The Kanpur Riot Commission 
Report was organized into three parts. The first and most substantial part was an overview of 
Hindu-Muslim relations dating back to 630 A.D when the first Muslim colonies were established 
in India. The second component was a daily narrative of the Kanpur Riots while the third part 
consisted of a list of remedial measures to correct Hindu-Muslim antagonism. It was the first 
section that was the most controversial and largely the reason why the Report was banned upon 
its publication. “On April 29
th
, a crate of 190 advance copies were seized just before dispatch to 
Calcutta. Acting hurriedly, the police confiscated the copies as ‘unauthorized newssheets’ on the 
grounds that the publication was a Congress document and therefore fell under the provision of 
emergency legislation.”
11
 In a memo to the Imperial Home Department, the British official 
involved explained, “the thesis of all these chapters may be summed up as follows. Hindu-
Muslim enmity, which never existed at all before 1800 A.D, is a creation of the British 
Government for its own selfish ends.”
12
 The Kanpur Riot Commission Report was received by 
governmental outcry in the nascent phase of its publication and as it became increasingly 
controversial, the denouement was a Report that became more famed than the subject it covered.  
Forgetting the Kanpur Riots, Remembering the Report 
 In the annals of Indian nationalist history, the Congress Report occupies a significant 
place. In his introduction to the 1976 reprint of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, Roots of 
Communal Politics, N. Gerald Barrier notes the Report “marks an important phase in nationalist 
historiography” because it represented the authors’ “systematic efforts to come to grips with the 
stages [of] Hindu-Muslim interaction.”
13
 Gyanendra Pandey, author of The Construction of 
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4 
Communalism in North India (1990), writes, “the Committee’s Report contains perhaps the most 
elaborate contemporary nationalist statement on the history of Hindu-Muslim relations in the 
subcontinent.”
14
 Bipan Chandra describes his work, Communalism in Modern India (1984), as 
“basically a work of synthesis; and the ideas and analytical insights of a large number of authors 
have influenced it or, in many cases, have been incorporated within it…This has been 
particularly true of the pioneering work of Jawaharlal Nehru, K.B. Krishna, Beni Prasad…and 
the Kanpur Riots Enquiry Committee appointed by Congress in 1931.”
15
 All three authors cite 
the Congress Report as being fundamental to an understanding of communalism. Even though 
the Report was released more than seventy years ago, celebratory receptions continue to greet 
reprints. On April 23, 2006, the National Book Trust of India (NBT) celebrated the release of an 
Urdu translation of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report entitled Firqavarna Mas’ala 
(Communal Problem). Founded in 1957 by the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the 
National Book Trust of India was an autonomous organization that received governmental 
funding to promote book reading across the nation. With respect to the reprint, the editor noted, 
in the June 2006 NBT newsletter, “the Report is a most valuable document on the reasons and 
factors responsible for the rise and spread of communalism in the country.”
16
 From the time it 
was published until today, the Kanpur Riot Commission Report continues to play an important 
role in discussions on Hindu-Muslim relations. 
 What has been obscured by the glorification of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report is 
the Kanpur Riots. In historians’ rush to examine the contents of the history included in the 
Report, the impetus that motivated the Congress Report has been largely forgotten. The history 
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5 
of Hindu-Muslim relations in India from 630 A.D. to 1931 in the first chapter has overshadowed 
the riot participants and their stories. Even the footnotes of the history have generated more 
discussion than the events of the Kanpur Riots. Barrier recounts how “the disagreement over fact 
and interpretation, in footnotes and in notes of dissent, shed further light on the process whereby 
a group of educated Hindus and Muslims dealt with a large assortment of evidence and tried to 
produce a statement acceptable to all parties.”
17
 Studies of historical literature on the Kanpur 
riots reveal a paradox between the event and the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. While the 
latter has been the subject of numerous discourses on communalism, the former has virtually 
been ignored in Indian histories. The Kanpur Riot Commission Report has had a major impact on 
the development of nationalist historiography whereas the Kanpur riots have come to be seen as 
simply another example of Hindu-Muslim conflict in the twentieth century. The subject of one of 
the most studied Reports by the Congress is one of the least studied riots. In short, scholars have 
not focused on the riots but rather written about the Report.  
 Monographs of riots in the 1920s and 1930s reveal that the events of Kanpur have not 
been the subject of major historical investigations. Excepting the reprint of the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report in N. Gerald Barrier’s book, Roots of Communal Politics and subsequent 
releases of reprints, no other narrative of the events of the riots exist.
18
 While the Kanpur riots 
are not unique in this sense—the 1920s saw Hindu-Muslim relations deteriorate to the tune of 
twenty-eight instances of sectarian strife, not all of which have been documented in separate 
monographs—what makes the Kanpur riots interesting is that the Kanpur Riot Commission 
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6 
Report has generated so much controversy while its initial purpose to recount the Kanpur riots 
has been unremembered.
19
 The Kanpur Riot Commission Report, however, is bound up in the 
Kanpur Riots. The question this thesis attempts to answer is what specifically about the Kanpur 
riots triggered the writing of the Congress Report and how and why has the Report been 
remembered so well in historiography while its subject has been forgotten? 
Resolving the Paradox  
 The answer revolves around the riot participants.  They were the subject and audience for 
the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. When the authors of the Report began their endeavor to 
explain the riots, they realized that the Kanpur Riots had occurred at a point in time when 
“communal riots,” violence between Hindus and Muslims, had become part of the nationalist 
jargon. The 1920s witnessed the gradual deterioration of Hindu-Muslim relations with a 
particularly vehement bout of violence occurring between 1923-1927. Beginning with the 
Mappilla Rebellion in 1921, riots in different parts of the country affected religious relations in 
other parts of the nation. Appreciating this fact, Bhagwan Das, in his memorandum to the 
Report, noted: 
The Cawnpore [Kanpur] riots were not an isolated and unusual occurrence. The 
Benares riots which preceded them by only six weeks were serious enough to 
have required a full investigation. They were only put into the background by this 
much greater tragedy. Other extraordinary occurrences have been taking place 
since, in British as well as in Indian India, in various places. Things have come to 
such a deplorable pass that riots can be caused almost at will by interested parties 
wherever and whenever it may suit them.
20
  
 
                                                 
19
 The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report document riots occurring in Malabar (1922), Multan (1922, 
1927), Ajmere (1923), Saharanpur (1923), Amritsar (1923), Sindh (1923) , Jubbulpur (1923) , Agra (1923, 1931), 
Rae-Bareli (1923), New Delhi (1924, 1926), Kohat (1924), Nagpur (1924, 1927), Indore (1924), Lucknow (1924), 
Calcutta (1925), Allahabad (1925), Sholapur (1925), Lahore (1927), Betiah (1927), Bareilly (1927), Kanpur 
(1927,1931), Surat (1928), Hyderabad (1928), Kalipaty (1928), Mumbai (1929), Azamgarh (1930), Dacca (1930), 
Muttra (1930), Mymemsing (1930), Daravi (1930), Basti (1931), Benares (1931), Mirzapur (1931), 228. 
20
 Bhagwan Das, Memorandum of Work, Kanpur Riot Commission Report, 39.  
 
 
7 
The Congress Report was a timely intervention, intended to correct a “perverted view of history” 
and erase “the conviction [that] had sunk deep into the public’s mind” that Hindu-Muslim strife 
was an age long phenomenon.
21
 The reason why the Kanpur riots gave way to the Report was 
because it was at this point, the authors discovered a new way to interpret Hindu-Muslim riots 
that did not rely upon framing Hindu-Muslim relations in rancorous terms. They discovered an 
alternative framework to discuss Hindu-Muslim relations that did not necessitate British rule.  
Chapter One will explore this framework and argue that as the findings of the Kanpur Riot 
Enquiry Committee were taken and used more ambitiously in nationalist histories, the Report 
became increasingly famous while the violence of the riots was forgotten. 
 Drawing upon the voices of riot participants, the authors of the Congress Report had 
framed their discourse in terms of the people they claimed to represent, citizens of Kanpur 
unaffiliated with the Congress Party or the British Government. In other words, the authors of 
the Congress Report made their work the medium by which the people were able to tell their 
stories. The day-by-day account of the riots was presented in the quotations of riot participants, 
and using their words, the authors of the Congress Report were able to show how the people’s 
thoughts and the Congress Party’s platform were indistinguishable. Chapter Two will elaborate 
on these findings while tracing the actions of ordinary citizens of Kanpur during the riots. 
The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report called upon the people to overturn 
two justifications of British rule; first, that Hindu-Muslim strife was an ongoing problem in 
India, and second, British rule was necessary for the maintenance of peace. While riot 
participants successfully overturned these two assumptions, the authors of the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report went one step further, extrapolating that the Congress Party was free from 
any “communal” feelings. The words of riot participants do not agree with this claim and 
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Chapter Three will examine what can be gleaned from the quotations used in the Report as well 
as those included in a “Note of Dissent” by one author, Maulana Zaraful-Mulk.  
 My overarching argument is that the Report became a famed piece of nationalist writing 
because it was the first attempt by the Congress Party to comprehensively state their position on 
Hindu-Muslim relations while the Kanpur Riots became unimportant because it was only the 
vehicle through which the Congress authors presented their findings. Yet, the riots were 
important because they gave the authors the opportunity to couch their discovery in the voices of 
riot participants. The authors sought to cement their position as the people’s representative 
through the Report but were not ultimately successful when the voices of riot participants did 
wholly resonate with their claims; to a certain extent, riot participants held the Congress Party 
responsible for increasing Hindu-Muslim tensions. 
The Evolution of this Study 
 When I began this project more than a year and a half ago, my intention was not to study 
the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. I expected to use the source to aid my investigation of the 
Kanpur Riots not to evolve into the subject of my investigation. I have my fieldwork in the 
National Archives of India and conversations with my thesis advisor to thank for leading me to 
discover the richness of the Report.  
 My time in India, August 3, 2007-September 3, 2007, allowed me to access the private 
papers of British officials involved in the riots, government correspondences, the British 
Commission Report in the National Archives of India and examine two newspapers, The 
Statesman and The Leader in the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi. Every 
aforementioned source discussed, if not decried, the official inaction during the riots. In 1931, 
the Kanpur Riots were not only notable for the tremendous loss of life but also the moral 
 
 
9 
illegitimacy of the British Government in the aftermath for failing to take control during the 
strife. Yet, when I consulted secondary sources, these two facets of the Kanpur Riots were 
overshadowed by the publication of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. Histories of modern 
India cited the historical findings of the Report more than they delved into the Report’s narrative 
of what had happened during the riots.
22
 What I discovered was the paradox between the impact 
of the Kanpur Riots in 1931 and how the Kanpur Riots have been remembered today. 
 As I began to outline my thesis in the September of last year, I realized that the 
allegations of police inaction during the riots were undisputed and the British response in Kanpur 
was not unique. In essence, what had captured the media and government’s attention in 1931 
were facts that left little room for historical interpretation. My initial idea of assigning culpability 
for the Kanpur Riots dissolved and I faced the problem of providing a context for the paradox 
between the memory of the Kanpur Riots and how they were written about in 1931. During a 
meeting with my thesis advisor, I recall him asking what the assumptions of the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report were. His questions led me to re-examine the contents of the second part of 
the Report, the daily narrative of the Kanpur Riots, and as I documented each quotation by a riot 
participant, I made the discovery that shaped my thesis: the Kanpur Riot Commission Report 
was the Congress Party’s attempt to portray themselves as the people’s representative and their 
efforts were only partially successful when some of the riot participants did not agree.  
I hope the following three chapters illuminate the impact the Kanpur Riot Commission 
Report while establishing how the people of Kanpur are critical to an understanding of its 
historical significance. Collectively, these three chapters explore a piece of nationalist writing 
                                                 
22
 Examples of works include: Bipan Chandra, Communalism in Modern India (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing 
House, 1984); Chitra Joshi, “Hope and Despair: Textile workers in Kanpur in 1937-38” and the 1990s” 
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10 
that has long dominated discussions of communalism and nationalism. By making the riot 
participants the centerpiece of my thesis, I hope to draw the reader’s attention to the way the 
Kanpur riots have been remembered and the dichotomy between the people and the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE MOMENTUM OF THE KANPUR RIOT COMMISSION REPORT 
 
 
“The Kanpur riots were only a most violent manifestation of a deep-seated disease 
which has been growing actively for the last ten or twelve years, out of germs fostered in 
the body politic of India, for some generations at least. From the conditions we saw and 
the evidence we recorded, we became convinced that mere temporary palliatives would 
be of no avail, and that by confining efforts only to areas of violent repercussions the 
Congress would be wasting energy.”
 23
  
    Bhagwan Das, Chairman of the Congress Committee 
 
Introduction 
 Perhaps the Kanpur Riots present a valid paradox. By 1931, sectarian strife had become 
a common phenomenon in India and from a bird’s eye perspective of Hindu-Muslim relations, 
the Kanpur Riots were a blip in a long sequence of religious clashes. The Kanpur Riots, in some 
respects, were unremarkable. Yet, the Kanpur riots led to the Congress Report. The violence in 
Kanpur was the reason the Congress at Karachi on March 31
st
 passed a resolution “appoint[ing] a 
Committee to discover the causes of the tension and to take such measures as may be necessary 
to heal the breach and to prevent the poison from spreading to the adjoining areas and 
districts.”
24
 The Kanpur Riots spurred the Congress Party to recognize that religious strife had 
become a nationwide phenomenon where deteriorating religious relations in one part of the 
country could affect religious relations in a different part of the country. The question then 
remains: why has the memory of one of the major religious riots in the 1930s faded while the 
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Congress authored Kanpur Riot Commission Report become such an important text? To put it 
briefly, why does this paradox exist? 
 The answer lies within the pages of the Report and is bound up in the context of 
sectarian strife in the 1920s. The riots occurred at a time when nationalist leaders such as 
Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi decried the primacy of religion over nationalism. The 
Kanpur Riot Commission Report was a formalization of a number of findings that had already 
been articulated by the intelligentsia. The Report was a comprehensive statement of ideas and 
feelings that had long been expressed before its creation. In his introduction to the reprint of the 
Report, Gerald N. Barrier maintained, “the attempt to reinterpret the evolution of communalism 
constituted a major document in itself…The overall handling of data and the systematic effort to 
come to grips with the stages in Hindu-Muslim interaction are vital. They mark an important 
phase in nationalist historiography.”
25
 Occurring after a decade of religious strife, the Kanpur 
Riot Commission Report was formulated as a rejoinder to the increasing sectarian strife “which 
appeared to be deteriorating with each passing year.”
26
  
 The findings of the Commission revolved around the argument that Hindus and 
Muslims had been moving toward a synthesis that was disrupted by the British who actively 
sought to instigate tension and conflict. This version of history, formalized in the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report, became part of the nationalist school of history. The fundamental tenets of 
this type of history “emphasized not only “tolerance” and synthesizing capacities that had gone 
into the making of Indian civilization but also the automatic commitment of India’s inhabitants –
older and newer to the soil of the land and the Indian nation.”
27
 The nationalist version of 
history, in short, stressed how India’s inhabitants shared an innate “Indian-ness” that connected 
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them to each other and the land. This view of history was first propagated by the authors of the 
Kanpur Riot Commission Report and then taken and used more ambitiously in later secular 
histories of India. Nationalist authors such as Jawaharlal Nehru (1936), Beni Prasad (1946), 
Nilakanta Sastri (1950), Bipan Chandra (1969), S.N Sen (1979), S.K. Ghosh (1987), and S.R 
Bhat (1990) would take the framework presented in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report and use 
it to write about Indian history. This framework was a nationalist rejection of colonial 
formulations that, for the first time ever, provided a formal nationalist statement on Hindu-
Muslim relations that continues to be invoked today.  
 This chapter will resolve the paradox between the Kanpur Riot Commission Report and 
the Kanpur Riots. In Part I, I will present a detailed overview of religious relations in northern 
India from 1920-1931. The purpose of this history is not to recount every incident of religious 
tension that occurred in the decade preceding the Kanpur riots but rather to depict how sectarian 
strife became increasingly virulent. I will contextualize the Kanpur Riot Commission Report to 
the events of the 1920s to argue that it was a response to this decade. Part II will centrally build 
on Part I by showing how the Report challenged colonial assumptions on Indian history and 
offered an alternative perspective to interpreting medieval India. The authors argued that, instead 
of conflict, this period was marked by synthesis and Hindu-Muslim amity. Part III will chart how 
the Report influenced the writing of Indian history through each subsequent decade following the 
Kanpur riots. I will show how nationalist historians borrowed the framework of the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report to interpret medieval and modern India. These three sections will explain the 
significance of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report by examining the endurance of the 
framework the authors created to view Hindu-Muslim relations. 
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Part I: The Context of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report: the 1920’s 
 The Mappilla Rebellion set the tone for the 1920s. Coming after the postponement of the 
Nationalist Movement by Mahatma Gandhi, the rebellion was in essence, “the culmination of a 
long series of Mapilla ‘outrages’ carried on for six months by peasant bands.”
28
 The Mappillas 
were the Muslims of Malabar, a region in southern India located between the Arabian Sea and 
the Western Ghats, and these “outrages” they committed were largely crimes against landlords, 
Europeans, and recent Hindu converts to Islam who had reconverted to Hinduism.
29
 In Malabar, 
the landlords and moneylenders were predominantly Hindu while the tenants, Mappilas, were 
largely peasants. The “class cleavage and antagonism” based along religious lines were sources 
of tension and numerous monographs of the riot document how mullas (Islamic priests) could 
successfully incite sectarian violence by pointing to this economic fact.
30
 The violence began in 
August 1921 and continued into 1922. During that time, a government force comprising of 
“almost two brigades of infantry and 700 special police” was raised to oppose the 10,000 
Mappilas.
31
 The strife officially ended on February 25, 1922 when British authorities removed 
martial law. In the aftermath: 
Battle casualties totaled 169 on the government side whilst about 4000 rebels were killed 
or wounded… According to official figures, 320 Hindu temples were destroyed in the 
course of the rebellion and 900 Hindus forcibly converted to Islam in Ernad alone. Of 
some 20,000 refugees who fled the zone of rebellion, the great majority were Hindus.
32
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Stories of the atrocities spread across the nation and “four months later, when the full impact of 
the Mappilla outbreak was beginning to be seen,” Gandhi exhorted his readership in Young India 
to believe that “nationalism is greater than sectarianism…in that sense we are Indians first and 
Hindus, Mussulmans, Parsis and Christians after.”
33
 The Mappilla Uprising evoked a nationalist 
response from Gandhi in the sense that he used it as a lesson to emphasize national ties over 
religious ties.
34
 
 As sectarian strife increased throughout the decade, the dominion of nationalism over 
religion would become a hallmark of Gandhi and Nehru’s speeches and writings. In an article 
entitled “Hindus and Moplahs [Mappillas]” in his newspaper Young India, Gandhi wrote:  
When a Hindu or Musulman does evil, it is evil done by an Indian to an Indian, and each 
of us must personally share the blame and try to remove the evil. There is no other 
meaning to unity than this. Nationalism is nothing, if it is not at least this. Nationalism is 
greater than sectarianism. And in that sense we are Indians first and Hindus and 
Musalmans, Parsis and Christians after.
35
 
  
Gandhi hoped to broach what he viewed as a hierarchy between national identity and religious 
identity. His comments called upon his readership to put aside religious differences in favor of 
building a national (meaning, all-inclusive) body politic. In his 1936 autobiography, Nehru 
elaborated on Gandhi’s distinction over the primacy of Indian identity over religious identity. He 
used the subordinate position of religion in comparison to politics to make a critique about the 
nationalist movement. In a chapter entitled “Communalism Rampant,” Nehru argued, “the want 
of clear ideals and objectives in our struggle for freedom undoubtedly helped the spread of 
communalism. The masses saw no clear connection between their day-to-day suffering and the 
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fight for swaraj.”
36
 Nehru maintained that the growth of Hindu-Muslim tension was due to a 
failure in the political process aimed at achieving independence and corrections needed to be 
made. That nationalism had been subordinated to religious communities was a problem and 
nationalist leaders such as Nehru and Gandhi hoped to rectify this issue. Commenting on the 
results of Nehru and Gandhi’s efforts, Pandey wrote, “sometime around the 1920s… India came 
to be seen very much more as a collection of individuals, of Indian ‘citizens’ rather than as a 
collection of communities.”
37
 However, even while some of the foremost members of the 
Congress Party began to conceptualize Indians possessing some innate sense of “Indian-ness,” 
episodes of religious strife continued to occur across the country.   
  In the aftermath of the Mappilla Uprising, riots in Multan and Ajmer broke out, the 
former in 1921 and the latter one year later. The year 1923 saw eight riots break out in 
Sahranpur, Multan, Amritsar, Multan (again), Sindh, Jubbulpur, Agra and Rae-Bareli.
38
  In his 
book, Communalism in Modern India, Bipan Chandra calculated that “during 1923-26, the four 
year period of maximum communal tension before 1946, there were 72 major communal riots, 
which gives an average figure of one riot every 20 days for the vast continent-sized and heavily 
populated country.”
39
 The primacy of religion over nationalism appeared to be complete during 
this decade. In his autobiography, Nehru recounted:  
Far more important [than his illness] was the progressive deterioration of Hindu-Muslim 
relations, in North India especially. In the bigger cities a number of riots took place, 
brutal and callous in the extreme. The atmosphere of distrust and anger bred new causes 
of dispute which most of us had never heard of before. Previously a fruitful source of 
discord had been the question of cow sacrifice, especially on Bakr-id-day…But now a 
fresh cause friction arose, something that was ever present, ever recurring. This was the 
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question of music before mosques. Objection was taken by the Muslims to music or any 
noise which interfered with their prayer in their mosques.
40
  
 
The “fresh cause” Nehru cited would become a generalized reason for the outbreak of religious 
strife. Acts of individual religious violence from 1923-1927 would lose their individual 
significance as they were recounted en masse as the period “marking the worst years of 
communal violence” before the 1947 partition.
41
 It was at this time when religious riots were 
becoming so common that acts of religious strife were seen as linked to one another.  
 To counteract this problem, Gandhi sought to defuse Hindu-Muslim strife across the 
country through fasts, visits, and public exhortations to end the violence.  In February of 1924, 
he spent three months in Bombay discussing sectarian strife with other leaders and drafting 
Congress proposals to better Hindu-Muslim relations. A few months later, he “commenced a fast 
in Mahomed Ali’s house in Delhi on September 17, [1924], creating the atmosphere for a Unity 
Conference, which passed, on September 27, a resolution deploring the strife which was 
spreading, condemning the riots as barbarous and contrary to religion and appointing a board of 
arbitrators who would decide disputes between the two communities...”
42
 Five months later, 
Gandhi traveled to Rawalpindi to persuade Hindus and Muslims to live peacefully in February of 
1925. Although less than a month later, on March 7, he declared, “for the time being I have put 
away in my cupboard this Hindu-Muslim tangle,” the Congress’ response to the increasing 
violence had already been formulated.
43
  The Congress Party’s reaction to the increasing 
violence was to host Unity Conferences, gatherings engaging both Hindus and Muslims to 
resolve contentious issues. In Nehru’s words, “during the middle ‘twenties many attempts were 
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made to settle the communal problem by mutual talks and discussions-‘Unity Conferences’ they 
were called.”
44
 He recollected:  
The most notable of these was the conference convened by M. Mohamad Ali, the 
Congress President for the year, in 1924, and held in Delhi under the shadow of 
Gandhiji’s twenty-one day fast. There were many earnest and well-meaning 
people at these conferences, and they tried hard to come to an agreement. Some 
pious and good resolutions were passed, but the basic problem remained 
unsolved. It could not be solved by those conferences, for a solution could not be 
reached by a majority of votes but by virtual unanimity, and there was always 
extremists of various groups present whose idea of a solution was a complete 
submission of all others to their views.
45
  
 
Nehru’s appraisal was accurate. Although the 1920s saw well-intentioned efforts to end Hindu-
Muslim strife, oftentimes, riots would follow on the heels of these conferences, negating any 
long-term influences they might have had. Referring to the 1924 conference, Nehru wrote in his 
autobiography: 
The Delhi Unity Conference of 1924 was hardly over when a Hindu-Muslim riot 
broke out in Allahabad. It was not a big riot. As such riots go, insofar as casualties 
were concerned, but it was painful to have these troubles in one’s hometown. I 
rushed back with others from Delhi to find that the actual rioting was over; but the 
aftermath, in the shape of bad blood and court cases, lasted a long time. I forget 
why the riot begun. That year, or perhaps later, there was also some trouble over 
Ram Lila celebrations at Allahabad.” Probably because of restrictions about 
music before mosques...
46
 
 
Nehru’s comments illustrated two important facets of sectarian strife. First, Unity Conferences 
did not have a lasting impact across the nation, and second, by 1924, music playing before 
mosques had already become a generic cause for conflict. This cause had been generalized to the 
extent that the reasons for violence had become superfluous to understand the event itself.  
 The 1920s continued to see a number of Hindu-Muslim clashes. Documenting the 
examples of sectarian strife in the decade, Chandra charted how actions connected with the 
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Congress led nationalist movement brought about bloodshed for both Hindus and Muslims. He 
wrote: 
The end of each of the three waves of nationalist struggle-1920-22,1930-34,1942-43-
added a feeling of political frustration and helplessness to the already frustrated existence 
of the people, especially of the petty bourgeoisie. The communalists and other 
reactionaries were able to use the real-life insecurity, anxiety, frustration and fears of the 
petty bourgeoisie and other social strata to attack other Indian groups, who were held 
responsible for their deprivation, etc.
47
  
 
In Chandra’s view, the “petty bourgeoisie” could be manipulated to cause violence. They were 
responsible for communalism. Beginning in the 1920s, clashes between Muslims and Hindus 
continued to escalate although religious reasons may not have accounted for the fighting. 
Chandra explained, “repeatedly as in 1915 and 1922 in Multan division, in 1926 in Rawalpindi 
district and in 1930 in Ferozepur and Multan districts, the Muslim peasants arose under the 
communal banner, directing their anger against the moneylender and his bahis (account books, 
where the evidence of their indebtedness was recorded).”
48
 Although economic grievances may 
have accounted for causes of conflict, the riots were recorded in the literature of the time as 
being part of a religious problem. Nehru, in his autobiography, provided a neat summation of 
riots. He explained:  
One is apt to exaggerate the significance of these riots in a few northern cities. Most of 
the towns and cities and the whole of rural India carried on peacefully, little affected by 
these happenings, but the newspapers naturally gave great prominence to every petty 
communal disturbance. It is perfectly true, however that communal tension and bitterness 
increased in the city masses.
49
  
 
Because the riots became famous as conflicts between Hindus and Muslims, they became 
important because of their connection with religious strife. As clashes continued in the 1920s, 
this perception of conflicts revolving around religious differences became increasingly acute.  
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 Riots in the last years of the 1920s and early 1930s continued in the same vein. Chandra 
noted, “the Bombay City communal riot of 1929 had features of a class war by proxy, a conflict 
between strikers and blacklegs. To break a strike in oil companies, the owners brought in Pathan 
strike breakers, leading to a fight between blacklegs and the strikers and their workers 
supporters.”
50
 In his book, The Construction of Colonialism in North India, Pandey remarked, 
“certain Hindu-Muslim riots in 1930-31 were isolated instances of class struggle fought in 
communal guise or fundamentally agrarian jacqueries or the fury of the urban poor.”
51
 Hindu-
Muslim tensions had become a cloak for any disturbance. Regardless of the cause of violence, 
what was clear by 1931 was that a series of clashes fought between Hindus and Muslims were 
deriving their political significance from the religious affiliation of the participants. Pandey 
wrote, “towards the end of the 1920s the Government of India drew up elaborate lists of Hindu-
Muslim riots that had occurred in the country in the recent past. From one of these, we learn that 
there were 112 serious ‘disturbances’ between 1923 and 1927, which left approximately 450 
dead and 5000 more wounded. The year 1929 produced a carnage in Bombay….Official 
[British] statistics put the number of casualties in Bombay at 184 and 948 wounded.”
52
 These 
statistics were alarming and evidenced the growing number of clashes affecting the country.  
 The 1920s had become famous for the outpouring of violence that engulfed the country. 
In his survey of modern Indian history, Sumit Sarkar listed a number of riots that had been 
instigated by “the recurrent ostensible issue [of the] Muslim demand for stopping mosques, and 
Hindu pressures for ban on cow-slaughter.”
53
 Included in his tally were: 
The violent anti-Hindu outburst at Kohat in the N.W. Frontier province in September 
1924, with 155 killed. Three waves of riots in Calcutta between April and July 1926, 
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[with a casualty count] of 138….[ there were] disturbances the same year in Dacca, 
Patna, Rawalpindi, and Delhi; and no less than 91 communal outbreaks in Uttar Pradesh, 
the worst affected province, between 1923 and 1927.
54
 
 
 The opening of a new decade did little to evoke a positive image of Hindu-Muslim relations in 
India. Prior to the 1931 Kanpur riots, outbreaks of violence occurred in Benares, Mirzapur and 
Agra in the early part of that year. While the causes of the three riots differed, what was common 
to all were explanations that drew upon the commonly held reasons for strife, namely music 
before mosques and cow-slaughter.
55
 Generalized sources of conflict had become recurrent 
reasons for violence and when the Kanpur riots occurred in 1931, the authors of the British 
Commission Report noted, “all these things had their echoes in Cawnpore [Kanpur] as over the 
rest of the province and beyond it, [and] in Cawnpore [Kanpur] careful and impartial observers 
had by now concluded that feelings had reached such a stage of bitterness and tension that an 
outbreak awaited only the occasion and time.”
56
 In short, the authors of the British Commission 
Report, to some extent, inferred the riots were inevitable. 
 While the inevitability of the Kanpur riots cannot be proven, what can be said is that at 
the outset of the riots, a series of clashes between Muslims and Hindus had broken out across the 
country. Though the causes of conflict may have been outside the realm of religious differences, 
they were publicized as such and their significance became entangled in questions of the 
compatibility of Hindus and Muslims. Although Gandhi and Nehru decried the primacy of 
religious identity over a national Indian identity, by the early 1930s, it appeared as though the 
issue of religious strife was not going to be resolved soon.  It was in this atmosphere that the 
Kanpur riots broke out on March 24
th
, 1931 and when the violence had finally ceased six days 
later, the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report took it upon themselves to address the 
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issue of increasing religion strife and explain Hindu-Muslim relations in a way that questioned 
colonial formulations.  
Part II: Conceptualizing Hindu-Muslim Relations 
 In the foreword to the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, Bhagwan Das, the principal 
author, noted that the expanded scope of the Report “arose from an observation that we feel that 
unless people begin to see the past in a truer perspective it will be very difficult or well–nigh 
impossible to restore mutual confidence and to arrive at a real and permanent solution of the 
present differences.”
57
 Das was justifying the inclusion of a 293 page-history of Hindu-Muslim 
relations, which he described as “an attempt to remove historical misconceptions [which was] the 
most indispensable step in the real solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem.”
58
 The authors of the 
Kanpur Riot Commission Report were fully cognizant of the atmosphere preceding the violence 
and their objective was to overturn colonial formulations about Hindu-Muslim relations. In doing 
so, they embarked upon a massive reconstruction of the history of Hindu-Muslim relations, and 
created a framework that continues to be invoked today. This section will document the major 
conclusions drawn by the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report.  
  The authors began questioning the colonial interpretation of Hindu-Muslim relations by 
discussing “The Muslim Period,” an era characterized by Islam’s peaceful spread in India and its 
subsequent peaceful coexistence with Hinduism. The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission 
Report recorded, “Islam spread peacefully practically in all her provinces…and the followers of 
the two religions lived in perfect harmony.”
59
 Hindu-Muslim amity was further enhanced by 
Muslims’ full integration into India. “Almost in every province Islam preceded the establishment 
of Muslim political power by centuries and the Muslim colonists [were] found to live and 
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participate in every sphere of Indian life.”
60
 These statements served two purposes. First, they 
refuted a contentious belief that Islam had spread through forced conversions “by sword,” and 
second, they showed that Muslims in India could be identified as Indians as early as 630 A.D 
when “the Arab colonies in India automatically became Muslim colonies, and the profound 
moral and economic impulse that Islam gave to the life of the Arabs had its immediate reactions 
in India by increasing the number and the importance of these colonies.”
61
 Muslims could not be 
regarded as foreigners because of their early arrival and integration into “every sphere of Indian 
life.” 
 As evidenced above, Hindu-Muslim relations in this era were marked by friendliness and 
cooperation. The authors of the Kanpur Enquiry Commission Report noted, “it is obvious that 
before the establishment of Muslim rule, Islam had already secured a firm footing in India, and 
Muslims and Hindus were living side by side and in perfect amity practically all over the 
country.”
62
 They supported their claims with examples of economic and political partnerships 
“from Cape Comorin to Hindu Kush,” noting that merchants and preachers had dispersed 
between these two respectively southernmost and northernmost parts of India.
63
 This evidence 
was further used to justify the postulation: 
If the antagonism and intolerance we find today had been inherent in the two systems, 
this was evidently the period when they would have found their fullest expression. …The 
outline of social conditions above indicates that Hinduism even in its most orthodox 
form, if left to itself, was incapable of generating forces of social bitterness towards 
communities outside its own social organization…If we find such forces existing now, 
they must necessarily be of later growth and foreign importation.
64
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The amity characterizing Hindu-Muslim relations before the arrival of the British is used to 
highlight a thinly veiled attack on the role of the British in propagating sectarian strife. This 
tactic would become a hallmark feature of nationalist histories featuring discussions of Hindu-
Muslim relations.  
 In the final section concluding the first chapter of the history, the authors of the Report 
contrasted perceptions of Hinduism, Islam and Christianity. Their objective was to overturn 
colonial formulations regarding the tenets and spread of all three religions. What this amounted 
to was a recital of the horrors of the Crusades in the Middle Ages and an explicit denunciation of 
the supposed bigotry associated with Islam. They wrote: “of the many wrong impressions 
prevailing at the present, one which is the most fruitful source of bitterness and ill-will is the 
impression that Islam is inherently bigoted and intolerant…History does not seem to justify us in 
giving a major share of it to Islam.”
65
 The two key messages of the chapter are first that Islam 
and Hinduism have no inherent characteristics that set them in opposition to each other and 
second, “foreign importation” plays a major role in instigating strife. These themes largely sum 
up the message of the next two chapters in which the authors ground their discussions in the 
“social and religious condition of India in the eighth century” and political developments during 
this era.
66
 
 According to the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, the next phase of 
Hindu-Muslim relations involved a shift from coexisting peacefully in India to increased 
interaction between the two religions. They recounted, “the two communities found it possible 
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not only to tolerate each other but to live and grow together with the utmost cordiality and co-
operation.”
67
 Hinduism and Islam benefited from the closer relationship. “Hindus and 
Musalmans were constantly influencing each other, affecting and changing each other’s ways in 
every walk of life.”
68
 The social synthesis benefited both parties involved. Though mentioning 
discrepancies that lay between elites and masses of both religions, the authors of the Kanpur Riot 
glossed over socio-economic differences that may have separated different communities and 
instead broadly highlighted tendencies to co-exist peacefully. They personified India as a mother 
for whom “the Hindu and Muslim communities cooperated whole-heartedly in her political and 
economic advancement.”
69
 Indians, as seen through this description, were tolerant people whose 
commitment to religious tolerance had endured for centuries.  
 The idea that Hindus and Muslims peacefully co-existed hurriedly ends in 1815 when the 
“British period” commenced. No longer do the authors of the Report focus on the “amalgamation 
of two cultures” but rather stress how both Hindus and Muslims became pawns in the British 
policy of “divide and rule.”
70
 They use the words of former British leaders to articulate the 
policy of “divide and rule” as it is devised by them. Quoting the minutes of Lord Elphinstone, 
Governor of Bombay in 1858, they cite, “Divide et impera’ was the old Roman motto and it 
should be ours.”
71
 The authors go on to quote Lieutenant John Coke who states, “our endeavor 
should be to uphold in full force the (for us fortunate) separation which exists between the 
different religions and races; not to endeavor to amalgamate them. ‘Divide et impera’ should be 
the principle of the Indian Government.”
72
 The words are damning and serve to bolster the 
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authors’ claim of British culpability in promulgating religious violence. The authors of the 
Kanpur Riot Commission Report recounted a litany of British actions that forced Hindu-Muslim 
relations to deteriorate. Among the actions was the “abolition of Persian as the Court language” 
which had the effect of causing the education of Muslims and Hindus to diverge with Hindus 
receiving a more Anglicized education and consequently more opportunities in the civil 
service.
73
 The most harmful policy, however, according to the authors was the implementation of 
separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims.
74
 This system “was the crowning measure of the 
divide-and-rule policy. The wedge thus devised was by its very nature calculated to obstruct the 
growth of Nationalism and could at will, by well-directed blows, be made to sink deeper and 
deeper into the body politic.”
75
 How the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report viewed 
the impact of separate electorates is best described in their own words: 
After this nothing could be done but to let things work. The religious tension was already 
there; the political sections had been successfully divided; the civic and economic life 
were too effectively in hand; all that remained was, when [divide-and-rule] policy 
demanded, to pull a wire here and a wire there at psychological moments to produce the 
desired explosion. In fact, so dependable were the batters and so charged remained the 
atmosphere with destructive energy that, as we shall see, huge explosions, were suddenly 
created at moments, when politically and even in their religious moods the communities 
were most united. And through these explosions, well-managed and well-timed, the rising 
tides of the national movement as they rolled against the Government one after the other, 
were successfully attacked, weakened and even broken.
76
  
 
The effect of separate electorates was multifold. Blaming the British authorities for allowing 
civic, political, religious and social lines to be drawn between Muslims and Hindus, the authors 
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of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report depicted the British Government as morally corrupt for 
not only failing to safeguard peoples’ liberties but even provoking “explosions” among them. 
    While documenting actions that drove a wedge between Hindus and Muslims, the 
authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report portrayed the two groups as one victimized 
population. “Muslims began to realize to their great sorrow and discomfiture that the British 
Government, whom they supported in India and considered their saviour against the Hindus, was 
merely using them as its tool to secure its position in India…”
77
 British policy had undermined 
and betrayed Indian interests. It was the imposition of British policy that had resulted in religious 
intolerance. As depicted in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, Hindu-Muslim relations were 
based on three tenets. First, Hindus and Muslims did not bear any grudges toward members of 
the opposite community until the establishment of British rule. Second, they were part of a 
population that had been collectively wronged by the British and third, their ability for self-rule 
was only constrained by British policies. These three facets of Hindu-Muslim relations 
overturned and cast away the justification for the British Raj, namely that British authority was 
necessary to prevent sectarian strife.   
Part III: Examining the Relevance of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report  
 The Kanpur Riot Commission Report had undermined colonial formulations about 
Hindu-Muslim relations through a historical survey of India’s past. The authors of the Report 
offered an alternative framework to view Hindu-Muslim relations that maintained Hindus and 
Muslims could live peaceably and that sectarian strife was a result of British efforts. What the 
authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report did was address the emergence of communalism 
as a threat to the National Movement. “Communalism” is one of the most highly charged words 
in works discussing India and this section will examine the development of the term and its 
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continued use in nationalist historiographies. My argument is that the Kanpur Riot Commission 
Report remains relevant today because its conclusions, offering a nationalist response to colonial 
charges of inherent religious tensions between Islam and Hinduism, continue to be cited in 
discussions of Hindu-Muslim relations.  
  “Communalism” was a term coined by the British to describe religious relations 
exclusively in India. As Pandey noted, the term was “never applied to feudal Europe or to other 
pre-capitalist societies where religiosity was no narrower and strife between members of 
religious persuasions nor rare… But was reserved for the analysis of social and political conflicts 
in the “backward” part of the colonial and post-colonial world.”
78
 Communalism, then, was a 
derogatory term. For colonialists, communalism captured a “basic feature of Indian society,” one 
that belittlingly portrayed Indians as irrational, violent and religiously intolerant.
79
 From the 
British perspective, all violent disturbances could be simplified as religious riots with the 
contextual motives becoming unimportant, as the root cause was already known. In the preface 
to his book, The Construction of Communalism in North India, Pandey described communalism 
as “a product of a colonial interpretation of history in which religious assemblages (especially 
“Hindus” and “Muslims”) existed as sharply differentiated and always already constituted and 
antagonistic communities whose history consisted of period bouts of bloodletting.”
80
 British 
authority was necessary insomuch as Indians could not be trusted to rule themselves. 
Communalism provided certain stereotypes and typecasts which colonial histories implemented. 
The impact on colonial histories was that the colonialist interpretation of communalism became 
the template to view and write about Indian history. 
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 Without questioning the framework of communalism, nationalists plied it into the “Other 
form of nationalism.”
81
 Communalism consisted of “separatism, antagonism, and violence.”
82
 It 
was an obstacle that needed to be surmounted. From the nationalist perspective, the colonialists 
and a small group of native Indians were responsible for these divisive elements. Communalism 
was a result of “the machinations of the colonial power” and its development in the 1920s was 
characterized by the efforts of Indian nationalists to contrast it with the legitimate form of 
nationalism that would give way to Lala Rajput Rai’s vision of India as “the Indian nation, such 
as it is or such as we intend to build it, nether is nor will be Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, or Christian. It 
will be each and all.”
83
 The nationalists agreed with the colonialists to the extent that they 
defined communalism as a problem facing Hindus and Muslims but they disagreed on the causes 
for the phenomenon. Whereas the colonialists attributed communalism to an innate characteristic 
of Indians that made Hindu-Muslim tensions an age-long phenomenon, nationalists interpreted 
communalism “as a problem of recent origins, as the outcome basically of economic and 
political inequality and conflict and as the handiwork of a handful of self-interested elite groups 
(colonial and native).”
84
 This disagreement between the causes of communalism would be a 
prominent feature in nationalist histories that explored Hindu-Muslim relations.  
 The Kanpur Riot Commission Report figures into this argument on communalism 
because the history within its pages was a nationalist interpretation of this phenomenon. The 
authors of the Report questioned colonial formulations of Hindu-Muslim relations and offered an 
alternative way to view Hindu-Muslim relations. Their efforts were unprecedented and the result, 
the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, was the first comprehensive statement by nationalists to 
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explain Hindu-Muslim relations in a way that pointed to colonialists, rather than Indians, as 
responsible for sectarian strife. Tracing the ideological genealogy of this schema, what stands out 
is how this framework continues to be invoked today.  
Decade-by-Decade: Following the Intellectual Genealogy of the Report 
 In 1936, Nehru published his autobiography. In reference to its publication, V.K. Krishna 
Menon, the editor of The Unity of India, a collection of Nehru’s writing from 1937-1940 
declared in his foreword, “the Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru is still the best book on 
modern India, up to 1935. The objectivity and restraint that characterize Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
thought and writing make the Autobiography history and not merely memoir.”
85
 Tracing his life 
through the political developments of India, Nehru provided a glimpse of Indian history that 
invoked the framework set forth by the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report only 
three years after its publication. His account featured the British policy of Divide-and-Rule, drew 
upon the essentialities versus non-essentialities of religious practices and rejected the purported 
incompatibility of Hindus and Muslims. Nehru maintained: 
 Of course, the British governments in the past and the present have based their policy on 
creating divisions in our ranks. Divide and rule has always been the way of empires, and 
the measure of their success in this policy has also been the measure of their superiority 
over those whom they exploit. We cannot complain of this or, at any rate, we ought not 
be surprised at it.”
86
 
 
This theme figures prominently in Nehru’s account, most visibly when he discusses conflicts 
between Hindus and Muslims. Nehru wrote: 
It seems amazing that a question which could be settled with mutual consideration for 
each other’s feelings and a little adjustment should give rise to great bitterness and 
rioting. But religious passions have little to do with reason or consideration or 
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adjustments, and they are easy to fan when a third party in control can play off one group 
against another.
87
 
 
His comments echoed Lajpat Rai’s earlier statements regarding religious customs that could 
offend either Hindus or Muslims, a facet of Hindu-Muslim relations the authors of the Kanpur 
Riot Commission Report also draw upon. By putting forth this argument, Nehru advanced a 
central message of the Report.  
 The final way Nehru framed his history of Hindu-Muslim relations was to cast away the 
idea that strife is an inherent feature of Hindu-Muslim relations. In one of the final sections of his 
autobiography, he contended, “stress has been laid on the ‘Muslim nation in India,’ on ‘Muslim 
culture’ on the utter incompatibility of Hindu and Muslim ‘cultures.’ The inevitable deduction 
from this (though it is not put baldly) is that the British must remain in India forever and ever to 
hold the scales and mediate between the two ‘cultures.’
88
 Nehru’s reflections on India mirror 
those of the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. The way he framed history is 
identical to the way the authors of the Report document Hindu-Muslim relations. Only three 
years after its publication, the conclusions of the Report can be found in one of the famous 
Indian nationalist’s memoirs.  
  In 1946, Beni Prasad, in his work, India’s Hindu-Muslim Questions adopted the 
framework laid out by the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report in his extensive 
survey of Indian history from the “arrival of the Musalmans” to his discourse on the problems 
affecting India in the 1940s.
89
 His opening chapter documenting how “Hinduism and Islam 
Stand Face to Face, ” the “Reciprocal Influences” each share as Islam takes root in India and the 
“Religious Reapprochement” mirrored the opening section titles of the Kanpur Riot 
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Commission Report.
90
 The early sections of the history describing the same era as Prasad’s 
section titles are: “Attempts at Early Synthesis,” “The Meeting of Islam and Hinduism,” and 
“India Wanted a New Synthesis.”
91
 The titles are similar to the extent that they are 
interchangeable. While the examples they cite are dissimilar, the conclusion is the same: Islam 
and Hinduism coexisted peacefully. Prasad, like the authors of the Report, described the 
“fusion” between Hindu and Muslim manners, customs and art, as evidence of a broader 
national identity linking all Indians.
92
 “In all these spheres,” Prasad wrote, “there emerged by 
the eighteenth century a solid and permanent achievement, basically Indian, strictly speaking, 
neither Hindu nor Muslim in technique.”
93
 Prasad’s interpretation of early Hindu-Muslim 
relations and the resulting affiliation between the two communities speaks to nationalist goal of 
showing how India was an integrated socio-political entity before the British arrived. Both 
Prasad and the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report “portended the existence of a 
common will, a common objective, and a united resistive power.”
94
  
 The similarities between the Kanpur Riot Commission Report and Prasad’s India’s 
Hindu-Muslim Questions carry through to the arrival of the British. As Nehru did in his work, 
Prasad held the British responsible to some extent for the “the broader problem” of Hindu-
Muslim that revolves around “the communal problem.”
95
 Prasad elaborated: 
The British acquiesced in policies and actions calculated to sustain and accentuate the 
differences between the communities-the omission to eradicate illiteracy and poverty, 
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differential treatment, separate electorates, extraordinary delays in political 
settlement…
96
 
 
Although Prasad’s censure of the British is more muted than the authors of the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report’s condemnation, both blame the British Government, to some extent, for the 
creation of communalism. Though Prasad never uses the specific term, “communalism,” in his 
discourse, he alludes to it as the “communal problem” or “differences between communities.”
97
 
Prasad’s discourse fits with and advances the framework established in the Report because of its 
complete acceptance of the nationalists’ version of early Indian history and its censure of the 
British in propagating strife.  
 In 1950, K.A Nikalanta Sastri, a professor of Indian history at the University of Madras 
published his three-volume History of India. He declared in the preface of his third volume that 
“this part deals with more live issues than its predecessors. The embers of controversy are still 
warm over several questions; as far as possible I have tried to take account of all the rival points 
of view, but have not hesitated to indicate my own opinions.”
98
 Sastri’s opinions match the 
beliefs of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. His discussion on communalism highlighted the 
culpability of the British in promoting sectarian strife. In a section entitled, “Communalism 
Fomented,” Sastri wrote, “meanwhile Anglo-Indian officials and non-officials had got busy 
setting up the Muslims and other minorities to obstruct the smooth passage of political 
reform…and British Indian officialdom rejoiced at the success that had attended their wicked 
intrigue.”
99
 Sastri evidenced the 1906 creation of the Muslim League, a reaction to the heavily 
Hindu Congress Party, as an example of the “wicked intrigue.” His description resonated with 
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the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report’s portrayal of the League’s founding. They 
maintained: 
Not content with the deadly antagonism it had thus created, the Government now 
conceived a still more disastrous scheme for perpetuating it. About this time it whispered 
into the ears of some responsible Muslim leaders (many of whom have since made 
repentant confessions) that they should demand separate electorates…This created new 
hope and a new upheaval…and an organization under the name All-India Muslim League 
came into existence.
100
 
 
The British Government, as characterized by both accounts, was sly and manipulative. The 
similarity between History of India and the Report, however, goes further than both accounts 
censuring the British for the creation of the Muslim League. The way Sastri and the authors of 
the Report phrase their findings mirror each other. To a certain degree, the two accounts are 
interchangeable. Sastri describes the British policy of Divide and Rule in the same manner as the 
authors of the Report, evidenced by his description of the founding the Muslim League. 
    In 1969, Romila Thapar, Harbans Mukhia, and Bipan Chandra published a collection of 
essays entitled, Communalism and the Writing of Indian History. The anthology, spanning from 
ancient to modern India, discussed the development of communalism in opposition to 
nationalism. The conclusions they drew evidenced Pandey’s claims about communalism and 
showed how historians in the late 1960s continued to be influenced by the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report. In particular, Chandra’s essay, “Historians of Modern India and 
Communalism” drew upon the framework created by the authors of the Report.
101
 His critiques 
reflected recognition that certain assumptions regarding the nationalist account needed to be 
questioned and accentuated the significance of the framework in nationalist historiography. He 
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wrote, “the British use of Indian history to denigrate Indian national character and to ‘prove’ 
India’s unfitness for independence and democracy produced another distortion in Indian 
historiography and politics. The Indians countered this unscientific and unhistorical approach 
with an unhistorical approach of their own.”
102
 The connection between Chandra’s remark and 
the purpose of the history included in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report was stated in 
Bhagwan Das’ own words in the foreword. He explained that the motivation for including the 
history revolved around the “part which British policy has placed in [increasing tensions] and 
bringing matters to the present crisis.”
103
 Chandra’s point directly addressed Das’ assertion. He 
speaks to the importance of addressing the underlying motivations of nationalist writing. By 
doing so, he continues to make the Kanpur Riot Commission Report relevant more than thirty 
years after its release. 
   In 1979, S.N Sen published the History of Modern India. Focusing on Bengal, Sen traced 
the history of the region from 1765 to 1950 remarking in his preface that “the interplay of 
events… [makes] it the most fascinating period in Indian history.”
104
 Because of the similarities 
between his conclusions and the findings of the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, 
of note is Sen’s discussion of the “British Policy of Divide and Rule.” Describing the creation of 
the Muslim League in 1908, Sen recounted “with the foundation of the Muslim League, the 
cleavage between the Hindus and Muslims deepened….The result was the outbreak of 
communal riots between the Hindus and the Muslims which continued to mar the relations of the 
two communities.”
105
 Sen’s comments correspond with the authors of the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report’s findings that the League’s founding “sowed discord between the Hindu 
                                                 
102
 Chandra, “Historians of Modern India and Communalism,” 45.  
103
 Kanpur Riot Commission Report, 45.  
104
 S.N Sen, History of Modern India, (New Delhi: Wiley Eastern Limited, 1979), i. 
105
 Sen, History of Modern India, 199. 
 
 
36 
and Mohemmedan communities by showing the Mohemmedans special favor.”
106
 Sen makes the 
same argument the authors of the Report formulated more than forty years earlier.  
In his book, Communal Riots in India (1987), S.K Ghosh exemplified the type of 
nationalist story telling in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. The purpose of his book was to 
“meet the challenge unitedly,” a reference to the need for Hindu-Muslim unity to combat 
religious tensions, or as termed in his tract, communalism.
107
 What is notable about Ghosh’s 
work are the similarities between his conclusions and what the authors of the Congress Report 
surmise. Beginning his narrative in pre-medieval India, Ghosh spent much of his first chapter 
commenting on “the fusion of Hindu and Muslim concepts, values, customs, art, literature, music 
and architecture during the past one thousand years.”
108
 This fusion, in his words, “is a living 
objective reality. Hinduism and Islam which command the loyalty of millions of sensible and 
peace-loving persons are not in conflict.”
109
 His words directly echo the authors of the Kanpur 
Riot Commission Reports’ description of medieval India. In the Report, the section entitled “The 
Muslim Period” is replete with references to the way in which “the two religions lived together 
in perfect harmony.”
110
 Both Ghosh and the Congress authors express an interest in showing that 
before the British arrived, Hinduism and Islam were not in conflict.  
While the subject of Ghosh’s work were the religious riots of the 1980s, the first half of 
his book was dedicated to explaining Hindu-Muslim tensions in the context of communalism. He 
remarked in a section entitled, “Anatomy of Hindu-Muslim Riots:”  
The very heterogeneous character of Hinduism made the Hindus less communal minded. 
 Though often non-communal themselves, the Hindus fell prey to religiosity and religious 
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 passions to oppose Muslim communalism as, for example, the Hindu Mahasabha, Jan 
 Sangh and Arya Samaj came into existence to oppose the communalism preached by the 
 Muslim League and Jamaat-e-Islami.”
111
  
 
Ghosh’s words mirrored the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report’s findings that 
“even in its most orthodox form, [Hinduism] if left to itself, was incapable of generating forces 
of social bitterness towards communities outside its own social organization.”
112
 Ghosh, almost 
word for word, replicates the findings of the Kanpur Riot Commission more than a half a century 
earlier. What is readily apparent in Ghosh’s account is the ease in which he places communalism 
at the heart of the problem. Communalism is not a foreign concept; rather as Ghosh used the 
concept, it was a natural way to discuss Hindu-Muslim relations. Writing in the 1980s, he 
maintained, “the trouble [religious tensions] arises when extremists try to convert this personal 
belief into communal antagonism in an effort to achieve power.” Communalism, a word codified 
by the nationalists in the 1920s and concretely defined in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, 
had come to be regarded as the natural framework to tackle religious strife between Hindus and 
Muslims.  
In 1990, S.R Bhat wrote The Problem of Hindu Muslim Conflicts. Viewed as highly 
relevant for the future of India’s development, the publishers noted, “this book gives the 
historical background of Hindu-Muslim conflicts in India which is threatening the very unity and 
integrity of this country.”
113
 Bhat’s short volume documented different facets of religious strife. 
What is striking about his history is the similarities it shares with the history included in the 
Kanpur Riot Commission Report. In a section entitled, “A Ruse of the Britishers,” Bhat writes, 
“[the British] gave a communal color to our history.” Bhat blamed British historians for 
                                                 
111
 Ghosh, Communal Riots in India: Meet the Challenge Unitedly, 28. 
112
 Kanpur Riot Commission Report, 61.  
113
Publishers, Acknowledgment to The Problem of Hindu-Muslim Conflicts, by S. R Bhat. trans. K. Badrinath 
(Bangalore: Navakarnataka Publications, 1990), i.  
 
 
38 
“depict[ing] Hindus as saints and Muslims as sadists…The atrocities and oppressions of one or 
two Sultans were generalized and the entire Muslim community was accused. The destruction of 
Hindu temples, vandalism, poll-tax, etc., were grossly exaggerated…. They propagated that 
Hindus were forcefully converted.”
114
 Bhat addressed a key point-that Islam spread by sword- as 
a popular misconception that needs to be overcome. The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission 
Report agreed and in a nearly identical passage they wrote, “acts of intolerance and persecution 
perpetuated through bigotry and pride of power or policy by some Muslim rulers and 
exaggerated accounts of them in our histories have raised strong feelings and created the 
impression that Islam has spread by compulsion or other unfair means.”
115
  Both the authors of 
the Report and Bhat view colonial histories as a source of misconceptions that have resulted in 
sectarian strife. In 1990, more than fifty years after the Kanpur riots, the findings of the Kanpur 
Riot Commission Report continue to gain credence as nationalist writers discuss Hindu-Muslim 
relations in the same terms as the Report’s authors.   
In the latest edition of The Construction of Communalism in North India, published in 
2006, Pandey illustrated how the Kanpur Riot Commission Report continues to be remembered 
in modern historiography: as an event that spawned the clearest example of how Indian 
nationalists viewed Hindu-Muslim relations. What is striking about Pandey’s conclusions is that 
he used the Kanpur Riot Commission Report to evidence his suppositions. He wrote, 
“reconstructed histories in the 1920s were to emphasize not only ‘tolerance’ and synthesizing 
capacities that had gone into the making of Indian civilization but also the automatic 
commitment of India’s inhabitants –older and newer to the soil of the land and the Indian 
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nation.”
116
 This description is a summary of the major findings of the Report and Pandey used 
these types of histories to document how communalism developed in opposition to nationalism. 
He additionally evidenced how the Kanpur Riot Commission Report could be seen as a 
comprehensive statement of nationalist voices in the 1920s. After quoting a 1925 speech by 
Lajpat Rai, a prominent Congress Party leader, Pandey, in a footnote, remarked how “The 
Congress Kanpur Riots Enquiry [Kanpur Riot Commission Report] made the same point.”
117
  
Pandey quoted at length: 
The real ultimate cause of all communal tension is the exaggeration of non-essentials in 
the religions. If there is any way whereby in the present conditions of life, the religious, 
moral and political practice of the people can be reformed, it is the inculcation far and 
wide of the fundamental truth that true self-government is Government by the higher self 
in all departments of life.
118
  
 
As Pandey claimed, the words almost resonate exactly with the content and phrasing of Rai’s 
speech, “if we really and honestly want a United India, we, i.e., the different religious 
communities in this country, shall have to make a clear distinction between the essentials and the 
non-essentials in religion…”
119
 There is a continuation of thought from 1925 until 1931. The 
Kanpur Riot Commission Report, in 2006, is used to prove a link between the communalism 
voiced in the 1920s and its discussion in the Report in 1931. To put it briefly, the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report remains relevant for contemporary historians as it was upon its initial 
publication in 1933. 
Communalism Revisited 
 In The Construction of Communalism in North India, Pandey defined communalism as 
“a form of colonialist knowledge. The concept stands for the puerile and the primitive-all that 
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colonialism, in its own reckoning, was not.”
120
 Communalism was a term developed by the 
British to articulate Hindu-Muslim relations as they understood it in India. Pandey termed 
communalism “colonial knowledge” because he was referring to the fact that the British packed 
their imperialistic notions into its definition. Communalism, then, was a lens developed by the 
British to view Hindu-Muslim relations and its formulation was a way for colonialists to 
understand Indians. It was a schema that had an underlying negative context. What was ironic 
was how nationalists adopted the term and used it to describe religious tensions among a number 
of religions in India.  Pandey’s argument puts forth this paradox and his study, concluding that 
“communalism” is an inadequate term, is the best examination of the term to date.   
Pandey’s case study of Benares showcased how the colonial version of communalism 
was enacted in historiography. The colonial histories describing the nineteenth century Benares 
riots accentuated the importance of religious “sites and the ‘irrational attachment’ of natives to 
them.”
121
 Even though Hindu-Muslim discord had not preceded the incident that it was the cause 
of the conflict was taken for granted. The rioters were reduced to religious fanatics and the riots 
were depicted as part of a long history of religious turmoil. The colonial narratives became “a 
master narrative…acting as a sort of model for all descriptions.”
122
 Certain assumptions 
regarding native behavior were established and a pattern of “evil clashes with evil; good 
intervenes; order is restored” was put into practice.
123
 The Kanpur Riots fit into this discussion 
because they could be substituted in for the Benares riot without much inconvenience:  
Throughout the nineteenth century and for long afterwards, the colonial narrative on 
communal strife tends to proceed by identifying the “first” major riot, that is, usually the 
first recorded after the establishment of British rule, and then tracing a straight line 
through the “last”- which of course keeps changing with the date of the writing (1904 in 
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the case on Mubarakpur in the Azamgarch Gazetteer of 1909; Kanpur in 1931 in the 
Government of India file on “Communal Disorders” prepared in the 1930s).
124
 
 
The Kanpur riots were, in essence, indistinguishable from a number of other conflicts between 
Hindus and Muslims. They were oversimplified to the extent that every other factor besides 
religious strife was omitted in describing the reasons for conflict. This method of ‘riot writing’ 
influenced the way Indian nationalists would describe Hindu-Muslim clashes.   
In Pandey’s words, “communalism and nationalism as we know them today picked up 
their significance in the 1920s…to a large extent in opposition of each other.”
125
 This idea gains 
credence in the number of nationalist writings and speeches Pandey evidences depicting 
nationalist leaders exhorting their countrymen to build a nation home for both Hindus and 
Muslims. He quotes Madan Mohan Malaviya; “just as Hindustan is the beloved birthplace of the 
Hindus, so it is of the Muslims too…”
126
 Communalism threatened this vision and in the 1920s, 
when the goals and methods of nationalism were being articulated by Nehru and Gandhi, 
communalism became the “flogging horse of nationalism….the product of a policy of Divide and 
Rule.”
127
 Pandey’s argument, in short, was that communalism developed side by side with 
nationalism in the 1920s and during the course of its articulation, it became the enemy of 
nationalism. 
Yet, the term is not adequate. Communalism is a term specific to India to describe 
religious relations. By nature of its colonial formulation, the word still possesses a negative 
context that disparages Hindu-Muslim relations in India. When the nationalists adopted the term, 
the failed to “fully appreciate its force, tentativeness or complexity.”
128
 Communalism was not a 
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natural way to discuss Hindu-Muslim relations and when nationalists failed to recognize this 
fact, they shaped the term in opposition to nationalism. What we have today is a number of 
books, among them, Communalism: Handled with a Difference (2000), On Communalism and 
Globalization: Offenses of the Far Right (2002), and  Communalism in Secular India : A 
Minority Perspective (2007), devoted to solving communalism, a problem of religious relations 
seemingly unique to India.
129
 
Conclusion 
 The religious riots of the 1920s paved the way for the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. 
The Report was written in reaction to the number of clashes nationwide and the authors sought to 
explain Hindu-Muslim strife in terms that did not characterize sectarian relations as being 
permanently rancorous. Their efforts amounted to a rejection of colonial formulations about 
Hindu-Muslim relations and the creation of an alternative framework that would be invoked by 
nationalist historians.  The connection linking nationalist histories with the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report is readily apparent. The history included in the Kanpur Riot Commission 
Report became a model for how nationalist historians interpreted the past as seen through every 
decade since its creation. The Report was unprecedented to the extent that it offered a 
comprehensive statement of nationalist ideas expressed in the 1920s. In that sense, the Report 
was a historical triumph and that it continues to be cited and drawn upon as recently as 2006 
evidences its significance and influence in Indian nationalist historiography. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
A NARRATIVE OF THE 1931 KANPUR RIOTS 
 
“The underlying and predisposing causes were of course: 
1) The spirit of lawlessness engendered by the Civil Disobedience Movement; 
2) The general ill-feeling and mistrust between the two communities which 
followed on the Civil Disobedience Movement (just as they followed on the Non 
cooperation Movement of 1921…”
130
  
                         District Magistrate J.F Sale in his testimony to the  
                        Official Commission of Enquiry 
Introduction 
 To date, no published secondary narrative of the Kanpur Riots exists. Despite the 
numerous references to Part II of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, an account of Hindu-
Muslim relations from the medieval era to the 1930s, the actual events of the riot have held little 
import to historians. In his work, Communalism in North India, Gyan Pandey used the authors of 
the Kanpur Riots Commission Report’s reinterpretation of history as evidence for his argument 
on communalism without delving into the context in which it was written. Sumit Sarkar, in his 
magisterial survey of Modern India, discussed the Kanpur Riots in a different way though still 
subsuming the actual events of the disturbance.  He described the riots as a part of a string of 
religious riots that characterized Hindu-Muslim relations in the 1930s. In neither work are the 
riot participants, citizens of Kanpur unaffiliated with either the British Government or the 
Congress Party, the central focus.  
 This chapter will attempt to remedy this lack of focus by reconstructing a narrative of the 
Kanpur Riots based on the British Commission Report, the Kanpur Riot Commission Report and 
the private papers of British officials involved. Because the two Reports only overlap at certain 
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points- particularly heinous atrocities committed and the death of Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi- this 
narrative will focus on bridging points of disagreements, namely, the immediate cause of the riot 
and the number of casualties in the aftermath. By themselves, the British Commission Report 
and the Kanpur Riot Commission Report are not reliable sources. Displaying obvious biases, 
each tends to promote its respective party-affiliated interests. The British seek to show the 
Kanpur Riots as the natural outcome of a state of religious intolerance while the authors of the 
Congress Report seek to show that the British are culpable for perpetuating the riots.  In what 
follows, Part I will describe the city of Kanpur, its population and economy, Part II will delve 
into the causes of the riots and Part III will chart the course of the Riots from their onset to their 
close. The goal of this chapter is to provide a context to understand the Kanpur Riots as it was 
documented by the respective authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, the British 
Commission Report, and the British officials involved. 
Part I: A Profile of Kanpur 
Geography 
 The city of Kanpur is located in as the state of Uttar Pradesh, known under colonial rule 
as the United Provinces.
131
 Situated in north India, Kanpur rests on the west bank of the Ganges 
River, approximately 120 miles from Allahabad and 42 miles from Lucknow.
132
 The city is 
shaped like an “irregular quadrilateral” with its shape defined by four right-handed angles to the 
north, east, west and south.
133
 Bordered by the Ganges River to the north and a major 
thoroughfare, Mall Road, to the east, the city proper of Kanpur is clearly defined. Two roads, the 
Meston Road, running north to south and Halsey Road stretching from the northwest corner of 
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the city to the southeast corner crisscross the city proper. Their intersection in the central portion 
of the city is called Moulganj.
134
 Because most of the rioting occurred within the bounds of the 
city proper, a detailed understanding of the topography of Kanpur is needed. The following 
description begins at the central portion of the city and makes a clockwise survey of the city, 
covering all the important points of conflict as pertaining to the riot.
135
 
 Slightly north of Moulganj on Meston Road is Teli’s temple and to the immediate west is 
the Macchli Bazzar Mosque. To the east of Teli’s Temple is Colonelganj, located half a mile 
away from the Civil Lines and Police Lines. Directionally, the Colonelganj is set a half a mile 
southeast of Gwaltoli, an outlying area near the Civil Lines. Directly south of Colonelganj is “the 
main populated area of the city consisting of an “oblong block running east to west and about a 
mile and a half deep.”
136
 South of this area is the Kotwali (police station) and the Collectorganj 
in the southeast corner of the city. Traversing the southern border from the Kotwali is the 
Muncipal Office and further west in the southeast corner is Anwarganj. To the north, following 
the perimeter of the western side of the quadrilateral is a narrow road whose southern portion is 
called Thathrai and whose northern portion is named Chauk Sarrafa.
137
 Next to the Chauk 
Sarrafa is the Chauk Sarrafa Mosque. Crossing Mall Road, southwest of the aforementioned 
mosque is the Chauk Bazaza, a narrow road, and within its proximity is the Chauk Bazaza 
Mosque. It is here the riots began. 
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Demography 
 As early as 1908, Kanpur had been regarded as an industrial and commercial center. 
Situated within close proximity of the rail system, “it [had] an unequalled means of 
communication with other parts of India.”
138
 Its rapid expansion and development saw the 
creation of numerous mills and factories for which it became famous for in the early twentieth 
century. In 1931, Kanpur’s mills employed over 20,000 people, approximately 10% of the total 
number of residents.
139
 The population was largely transitory with the mills’ need for workers 
determining the number of Kanpur’s inhabitants. Because the majority of Kanpur’s terrain was 
unsuitable for cultivation, industrial workers vastly outnumbered agriculturists. H.R Nevill, 
editor of the 1922 Gazetteer, stated that a “striking feature of the district is the proportion 
compared to other areas of the United Provinces of waste and barren land.”
 140
 In 1922, 34.65% 
of laborers were industrial workers compared to 17.35% who were employed as agriculturists. 
This trend persisted in the 1930s with both the respective authors of the British Commission 
Report and the Kanpur Riots Commission Report referring to the mills as a central feature of 
Kanpur’s local economy.  
 In 1931, Kanpur’s population was 242,356 with Hindus comprising more than two-thirds 
of the total number of people.
141
 Hindus generally lived to the northeast of Meston Road while 
Muslims resided in the southwestern portion of the area outlying Meston Road. In every thana 
(precinct), however, Hindus outnumbered Muslims.
142
 Both Reports concur that because Kanpur 
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appealed to a migratory population who came to work in the city’s numerous mills, the criminal 
element in the city was pervasive. In his testimony to the Official Commission of Enquiry, Joint 
Magistrate Barron noted, “there [was] always a large floating population seeking work in the 
mills, which forms a perfect screen for the activities of undesirables.”
143
 The Official 
Commission of Enquiry was the committee drawn up by the local British government in Kanpur 
to determine the causes and course of the riot.
144
 Statistics from the 1931 Gazetteer evidence the 
increasing rate of crime in the Kanpur district. Between 1922 and 1931, the “number of cases 
investigated by police” jumped from 3,404 to 5,643 per annum.
145
 The number of persons 
convicted on account of robbery or delinquency more than doubled from 30 in 1922 to 78 in 
1931. Though some crimes such as “bad livelihood” or “criminal trespass” decreased over the 
nine years, overall, crime had become a serious problem in Kanpur according to the Congress 
Commission and the authors of the British Report. The situation had drastically changed from 
when H.R Nevill, compiling the 1922 Gazeteer, wrote “…it may be considered from the police 
point of view [that Kanpur] is one of the least troublesome of the large cities in the provinces.”
146
 
Kanpur had become a home to numerous goonda (gangster) organizations and a major drug 
trafficking center in North India.  
Local British Government 
 The local Kanpur government was a part of the Allahabad division. The bureaucratic 
system consisted of a commissioner under whose jurisdiction were the magistrate and collector. 
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The magistrate and collector were in charge of what would now be considered mayorial tasks. 
They were responsible for the maintenance of “a covenanted assistant, three deputy collectors, 
and a treasury officer.”
147
 The District Magistrate in Kanpur was J.F. Sale. Beneath him were the 
Joint Magistrate, Barron and two Deputy Magistrates, Rameshwar Dayal and Islam Nabi Khan. 
Also under his jurisdiction was the police department, headed by Superintendent of Police, R. M. 
Rogers, and his Deputy Superintendent of Police, Khan Bahadur Saiyid Ghulam Hasnnain.
 148
 
Kanpur had three police stations, one located in the southeastern corner of the city at the 
Kotwali, one located directly opposite in the southwestern corner in Anwarganj and the third 
located to the northeast near Colonelganj.  
 The number of police forces in Kanpur differed from the official account and the number 
actually patrolling in the streets of the city. On paper, the armed police consisted of 4 Sub-
Inspectors, 32 Head Constables, 53 Naiks (corporals) and 500 Constables.
149
 In reality, on March 
24
th
, the first day of the riots, the “actual strength” was 4 Sub-Inspectors, 11 Head Constables, 19 
Naiks and 50 Constables.
150
 These figures, while approximately equal to Sales’ calculation of the 
number of troops in Kanpur, did not exactly correspond to his exact figures. Testifying in front 
of the Official Commission of Enquiry, Sale claimed that on the first day of the riots, “the 
following police were on duty in the city thana and on Mall Road, viz., 9 sub-inspectors, 39 NCS 
and 242 constables, while the following were present in the Police Lines ready for duty viz. 3 
sub-inspectors, 18 NCS and 66 constables of Armed Police, 2 NCSs and 50 Constables of Civil 
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Police; and 2 NCS and 28 Constables of Mounted Police.
151
 The number of available officials 
fell short of the official count and the authors of the British Commission Report cite these 
statistics as a significant reason for the spread of rioting.  
 It was these government officials and officers who held the responsibility of restoring 
order to the city and, when they failed to do so, were censured by the Kanpur Riots Commission 
Report and to a certain extent, by the British Commission Report.  
Part II: Foreshadowing the Riot 
 The riots of 1931 were not an extraordinary occurrence. Since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, Hindu-Muslim relations had been deteriorating. Although the authors of the 
Kanpur Riots Commission Report maintained that 1922 was the pivotal year when relations 
soured, communal incidents preceding that date had given rise to feelings of religious 
bitterness.
152
 A paramount factor in this increasing gulf between Hindus and Muslims was the 
rise of the Nationalist Movement in Kanpur. 
 In the early twentieth century, as a major industrial city, Kanpur was attuned to the 
goings-on of the national political scene. Though the respective authors of both the British 
Commission Report and the Kanpur Riot Commission Report maintained that business interests 
were a higher priority than political affiliations to the city’s residents, each Report noted the 
growing politicization of Kanpur. The British Commission Report documented the fact that “Mr. 
Gandhi’s movement… [has] attracted itself, for various reasons, the active support of more 
businessmen than has been the case with previous political movements in India.”
153
 The attention 
the Nationalist Movement was garnering affected both Hindus and Muslims, albeit in different 
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ways. Testifying in front of the Commission of Enquiry, Barron commented, “there can be no 
doubt that the Civil Disobedience Movement of the Congress Party ---- so has embittered 
communal relations. Mohemmedans being the numerical minority feel that they must have very 
definite safeguards for their own interests before Swaraj (political independence) is obtained. As 
Congress is a body almost entirely Hindu [and] has always been.
154
  When the Movement was 
called off by Mahatma Gandhi in 1922, “Kanpur…acted like the rest of India” with the former 
members of the Non-Cooperation Movement joining religious- what the Kanpur Riots 
Commission Report terms “communal,”- organizations.
155
 Fiery religious rhetoric could be heard 
in Muslim shops and religious festivals that had once been celebrated by both communities now 
began to be exclusively Hindu or Muslim. “Muslim boys were lectured not to buy Kheel or 
Batass at Diwali, and Hindu boys were asked not to buy or play with crackers at the Shab 
Barat.”
156
 This environment of religious exclusion gradually worsened during the 1920s, 
escalating in 1927 with Kanpur’s first ever religious riot. 
 Though the riot was quickly settled, its occurrence highlighted a major rift between 
Hindus and Muslims in Kanpur. While the British Commission Report is inaccurate in claiming, 
“the Muslims from the first had refused to join the [National] movement,” by 1927 it was clear 
that the number of Muslims within the Congress Committee was steadily declining.
157
 Reasons 
cited by both Reports were perceptions that the Congress Party had become a Hindu platform, 
Muslim interests were being ignored, and separate electorates were necessary to ensure equal 
representation. Though national overtures were made to persuade Muslims to join Congress and 
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some Muslims did join, overall, the efforts were not successful.
158
 The resumption of the 
Nationalist Movement in 1930 did little to alleviate religious tensions, instead exacerbating the 
problem with the increased implementation of hartals, pickets of stores intended to disrupt the 
local economy.  
 By 1930, hartals had become a mainstay of the Congress Party and both the British and 
Kanpur Riots Commission Reports devote significant time to explaining how the picketing 
angered Muslim shopkeepers who had chosen not to join the Movement. Barron remarked, 
“frequent hartals, proclaimed and enforced by Congress, and picketing of shops which dealt in 
goods of which Congress disapproved, inflicted pecuniary loss and hardship on all 
concerned.”
159
  Although hartals were supposed to be peaceful, overzealous Congress volunteers 
would “openly and deliberately…permit obstruction [of shops] by lying down before shops, etc. 
by forming cordons or standing close together and thus obstructing the passage.”
160
 Congress 
workers, as acknowledged by both Reports, forced shop closures and in response, the Governor-
General issued an ordinance in the May of 1930 declaring, “when resort is made to such methods 
it becomes necessary for Government to protect the freedom of action of those who may wish to 
sell and those who may wish to buy.”
161
 Going hand in hand with forced shop closures was the 
practice of disrupting vehicular traffic and forcing occupants to travel on foot. Though the origin 
of the practice remains in dispute, with both Hindus and Muslims claiming the other side 
initiated the custom, its harmful effects were apparent.  
It was during this atmosphere of religious tension that the Tanzim Movement arose. 
Barron recalled that the “Tanzim Movement sprang up in response to the successes of the 
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Congress party. It was primarily and outwardly religious but rapidly developed local political 
tendencies.”
162
 Ostensibly created for the purpose of reminding and ensuring Muslims performed 
their daily five Namaz, the Movement became progressively more militant and expanded to 
include the majority of Muslim residents in Kanpur.
163
 The activities of its followers comprised 
of armed processions in Kanpur and until January 16, 1931 when the Government banned the 
carrying of weapons, frequently included “ballams (spears), Kauralis (daggers), Khantas (axes) 
and even, drawn swords.”
164
 Anti-Hindu songs were sung by processors and accounts from both 
the Congress and British Reports describe how the movement was a Muslim reaction to what 
Muslims saw as a growing disparity between the two communities. A witness describing the 
Tanzim Movement to the authors of the Kanpur Riots Commission Report stated, “the unifying 
force of [Tanzim] was the fear which pervaded the Muslim community that the Hindu 
community wished to trample all the sentiments and the interests of the Musalmans.”
165
 The 
Tanzim movement introduced militancy in Muslim calls for recognition of their separate 
interests and both Reports recognized the movement as a contributing factor in the outbreak of 
the 1931 Kanpur Riots.  
 By March of 1931, Hindus and Muslims had diverged politically and economically. The 
National Civil Disobedience Movement had caused the initial fracture and subsequent religious 
developments ensured that both religious groups would see their interests as conflicting rather than 
as collaborative. In the span of eight years, from 1922-1930, when the Nationalist Movement was 
inactive, religious organizations proliferated to the extent that they divided Hindus and Muslims 
into two camps. The Congress Movement came to be regarded as a Hindu party, advancing 
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exclusively Hindu interests while the Tanzim Movement gained ground as a platform for Muslims. 
Though speculations in the Kanpur Riots Commission Report maintained that the British 
Government orchestrated the voracity of the Tanzim Movement, their own admittance that “no 
legal proof exists” makes it very difficult to substantiate their claims.
166
 A reading of the two 
accounts makes clear that numerous incidents, teasing out political and economic pressure points, 
had worsened the situation. 
 Baghat Singh’s execution, according to both sources, was “the spark that was needed” to 
set off the riot.
 167
 Similar to the Tanzim Movement, both Reports find it necessary to recount the 
illustrious, if short-lived, career of Baghat Singh and his subsequent hanging. Baghat Singh was 
a young revolutionary who had risen to fame at the age of 21 after killing J.P. Saunders, a 
Deputy Superintendent for Police.  One year later, he and a fellow revolutionary, Batukeshwar 
Dutt, threw a bomb into the National Assembly as a form of protest against the Defence of India 
Act, which was currently being debated on the floor. Shortly after detonating the bomb, Singh 
and Dutt turned themselves in. Though it was proven that the bomb was not intended to kill 
anyone (Singh and Dutt threw it away from the legislators), nor did it, both were tried and 
convicted. Another revolutionary, Shivaram Rajguru, was also arrested in the aftermath of the 
bombing after his participation in Saunders’ death was discovered. During his jail term, Baghat 
Singh along with his co-conspirators, “by various devices-hunger striking was only one of 
them…succeeded in bringing the usual procedure of law to a standstill.”
168
 Baghat Singh became 
a national hero and as efforts to secure his clemency failed, he became an inspiration for young 
revolutionaries. “His execution excited strong feelings among parties covering a wide range of 
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political thought” and though not to the extent the British Report claims, the Muslims did to a 
lesser degree “stand aloof.”
169
 
 In Kanpur, the day after the execution became known, hurried preparations were put in 
place for a hartal (boycott) to commemorate Baghat Singh’s execution in a nationwide 
campaign. Because British officials believed that the hartal “might be considered to be rather of 
the nature of pleas for mercy than of defiance,” in District Magistrate Sale’s words, they “were 
informed [by telephone] that they might permit the procession.”
170
 The Congress Party in Kanpur 
had “chalked out a programme for the observance of Bhagat Singh Day” which included a 
citywide “hartal, bare-footed and bare-headed, silent procession, [and a] meeting in the 
evening.”
171
 Although Congress leaders headed preparations to inform shopkeepers, “boys and 
young men would see that a hartal in honour of their own hero, Bhagat Singh, would be a strict 
and complete.”
172
 The strict enforcement of the hartal gave way to increasing resentment of 
Muslim shopkeepers and small clashes erupted across the city the morning of March 24
th 
as 
occupants of vehicles were forced to dismount. Sale recounted, “during the course of the 
morning there was considerable amount of rowdyism in the city by the promoters of the Hartal. 
They stopped the trams by blocking the lines with paving stones; people passing in ekkas (small 
vehicles) and tongas (rickshaws) were ----persuaded to get down. Stones were thrown at the 
Kotwali (police station) and at the Europeans passing in cars.”
173
 Both the British Report and the 
Kanpur Riots Commission Report reference the same two occurrences that occurred early that 
morning; the first, involving a Muslim woman who was forced to alight from her tonga and the 
second, an English woman who was compelled to get down from her car. Congressmen 
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countered the threat of violence by walking around the city and quelling minor tiffs. Thus, the 
morning, while seeing minor clashes break out, remained under control and authors of both 
Reports note how the turn toward communal violence only happened later. 
 Until this point, the British Commission Report and Kanpur Riots Commission Report 
are largely in agreement. The predisposing causes cited by both sets of authors concur and 
though the emphasis differs in which causes were more influential than others, the two accounts 
do not directly contradict each other. The afternoon of the 24
th
 marked a change in both Reports. 
What the Kanpur Riots Commission Report accepted as “universal fact,” the authors of the 
British Report “have no hesitance in rejecting.”
174
 That the course of the riot differs in each 
account can be explained by the fact the narratives were intended to fulfill two conflicting 
political goals. In telling the story of the riots, both sides hoped to mitigate the blame on their 
side and charge the other side with more responsibility for the bloodshed. 
Part III: A Daily Narrative 
March 24
th
  
 By noon on March 24
th
, the small skirmishes that had led to prominent members of the 
Congress Party traversing Kanpur on foot and quelling the small clashes had evolved into larger 
acts of violence. Gangs of young men shattered shop windows and threatened shopkeepers with 
further acts of vandalism if the shops remained open. “In Meston Road [one of the major roads 
of the city] the interference with Muslim shop-keepers continued, and at about 1:30 pm, it is said 
that Hindus had started throwing brickbats at a Muslim shop.”
175
 As both accounts noted, 
however, the violence had not turned communal. It would take two events, both unsubstantiated 
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by outside sources and rejected by the authors of the British Commission Report, to turn the 
violence into a religious riot. 
Although the two incidents are uncorroborated by other sources, their inclusion in this 
narrative is justified because it is a lack of evidence and not counterevidence that makes their 
claims weak. The first incident was recounted by three sets of witnesses. Though there is some 
variation in the anecdotes, at its core, the three statements can be simplified into the fact that 
exclamations of Hindu-Muslim strife preempted any such violence. According to witnesses in 
the Kanpur Riots Commission Report, “At about 12 o’clock,” three tongas each carrying two 
passengers passed by with the occupants “crying all the way with their hands outstretched 
‘Hindus and Musalmans have begun fighting!”
176
 The tongas were riding through the city with 
the occupants making the same exclamatory announcement. Another witness reported, “several 
people simultaneously proclaimed in various parts of the city that Hindus were assaulting 
Muslims and vice versa.”
177
 A third set of witnesses maintained that a policeman had instigated 
the violence by beating a “Hindu passer-by and to shout that the Hindus were murdering the 
Muslims on all sides…”
178
 Though not enough evidence exists to confirm any of these cases, 
what can be taken away is the common denominator that early in the afternoon, violence was 
provoked by shouts that sectarian violence were occurring even though circumstances up to that 
point had given no indication of religious strife.  
The second incident occurred shortly after and involved a Committee of Imperial 
Defence (C.I.D) agent who had affronted the crowd gathered by the Badshani Naka.
179
 The 
curious episode was explained by numerous witnesses who maintained: 
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That this man deliberately provoked the crowd. He first passed through them carrying a 
 bicycle on hand, and then having gone a few hundred feet, rode back and tried to pass 
 through that same crowd. Not being permitted to do so, he tried the ekk (a small 
 footpath), and after a final scuffle ran through the Moolganj crossing chased by the 
 younger elements of the crowd.
180
  
 
In what ensued, Muslims claimed the man had been Muslim and had been “beaten by Hindus, 
and so the Muslims at that place beat them in return.”
181
 The authors of the Congress 
Commission Report maintained that it was this confrontation that “is universally believed to 
have given a communal turn to the affair and started the rioting.”
182
 What is prevalent in the 
Congress explanation of the riots are various conspiracy theories involving the C.I.D, British 
Secret Service, involvement. For obvious reasons, not the least the lack of evidence highlighting 
Indian voices, their claims difficult to prove. For the purpose of this narrative, it will suffice to 
say that British involvement remains suspect but unproven. 
By 1 p.m., the riots had broken out in full force. Sale recounted that: “at about 1 p.m. a 
crowd of students and youths of the Vanar Sena suddenly rushed along the Mall breaking 
windows of Government offices, such as the Telegraph Office and of a good many commercial 
firms and shops eg. Mesaro Valerios and Sons, Confectioners, Hope Bros. Outfitters, the 
imperial Chemical Industries Ltd.”
183
 A witness cited in the Kanpur Riots Commission Report, 
Rai Sahib Rup Chand Jain, a banker and an Honorary Magistrate, corroborated Sale’s testimony. 
Declaring “a large number of rowdy Muslims were seen scattered on Halsey and Moolganj roads 
armed with lathis (clubs), ballams (spears), khantas (axes), etc.,” Jain confirmed Sale’s account 
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of violence in the city proper.
184
 Mounted police dispatched to quell the violence at 3 p.m. were 
unsuccessful when “they failed to catch anyone” according to Sale’s testimony.
185
  
 At Moolganj Crossing, in the center of the city, two groups of Hindus and Muslims, 
numbering 100-200, were throwing stones at one another. As reported to a Congressman, the 
immediate cause of the clash was a reaction to news that Hindus had been attacking Muslims at 
Badshahi Nak.
186
 British policemen headed by the Kotwal, Khan Bahadur Syed Ghulam 
Hasnain, emerged on the scene to restore calm. Hearing that G.G Jog, a prominent Congressman, 
had been killed, the Kotwal went to investigate, delegating the task of restoring peace to the 
“Station Officer, Kotwali, and the armed guard.”
187
 He found that Jog had only a slight injury 
and meeting Ganesh Vidyarthi on his way back to Moolganj Crossing, he enlisted the latter to 
publicize the fact that Sri Jog had only been injured. The Kotwali set about dispersing the crowd 
at the crossing and then proceeded to Shera Babu’s Park where he found a number of Muslims 
wrecking religious emblems of different faiths that had decorated the park. By this point, around 
4 p.m., numerous clashes had broken out across the city. The Ban Bazaar Mosque had been 
partially destroyed by Hindus and at Badshahi Nak, fighting had restarted. Rioters had set the 
Chauk Bazaza Mosque on fire and in Saraffa, agitators looted shops. In his testimony, Joint 
Magistrate Barron Reported, “the telephone bell rang constantly [at the District Magistrate’s 
residence] and I received many messages from excited people begging for assistance as there 
was great disturbance in the city.”
188
 District Magistrate, J.F Sale, had been summoned. But in a 
brief conference at Shera Babu’s house, “it was decided that the police could still deal with the 
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situation without military aid.”
189
 In making his decision, Sale ignored the advice of Rameshwar 
Dayal, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who was present at the meeting. According to his 
own testimony, Sale had already dispatched troops to the Queen’s Park at 3 p.m.
190
 Barron 
supported Sale’s claims of addressing the violence by citing that “at about 5:50 pm. At Moolganj 
there was a Police picket of about 20 or 25 men.”
191
 Yet, these measures were insufficient to 
quell the citywide rioting that was consuming the city.  
 Personal anecdotes from the Kanpur Riots Commission Report evidence the growing 
hysteria affecting Kanpur. Sale remarked that throughout the course of the day, “various parties 
of Hindus and Mohemmedans came up in rather an excited manner complaining of each others 
attacks and they were assured that every possible protection would be given, if they kept 
quiet.”
192
 Despite his assurances, rioters set the Meston Road temple on fire. Sale sent two 
magistrates, Anand Swarup and Gauri Prasad, to help the police and fire brigade to douse the 
flames. Swarup arrested two looters and in doing so observed that the Misri Bazaar, located in 
close proximity, was being looted.
193
 He “stopped the men from looting and drove them 
away.”
194
 Swarup then phoned Sale, informing him the situation was rapidly getting out of hand 
and reinforcements would be necessary. Supporting Swarup’s calls for extra help was the looting 
of the Etawah Bazaar that evening around 7 p.m. The police company, responding to Swarup’s 
calls, sent a force of “two officers and 66 British other ranks…to Meston Road.”
195
 The situation 
worsened from the late afternoon through the evening when Sale decided to call for additional 
military reinforcements at 8 p.m. Through the night, as military reinforcements consisting of the 
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second company of Highland Light Infantry arrived on Meston Road, acts of arson and pillaging 
continued to wreak havoc upon the city 
March 25
th 
 
Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi, described in the Kanpur Riots Commission Report as “the 
only person who even in this crisis could command some moral authority and exercise some 
restraining influence,” sought to single-handedly end the riots and his endeavors form the bulk of 
the Kanpur Riots Commission Report’s narrative of the events of March 25
th
.
196
 A letter 
reprinted in the Kanpur Riots Commission Report and later in the The Leader, a newspaper 
based in Allahabad, captured many of the sentiments and events of the 25
th
. Writing to a close 
friend who had offered her services to help quell the riots, Vidyarthi responded, “at present I 
cannot ask you to come out….The police stands by watching unconcerned while mosques and 
temples are burnt, people are beaten and shops are looted.”
197
 Police inaction was a common 
thread in the different narratives that comprised the Kanpur Riots Commission Report’s retelling 
of the riots and Vidyarthi’s letter serves as verifiable proof of British culpability during the days 
of the riot. 
 Returning to Kanpur, throughout the morning, violence escalated as arson and fighting 
spread to outlying areas of Kanpur . “By 6 a.m., Mr. Seward found arson and fighting in progress 
in Sabzimandi, Coolie Bazaar, and Cooperganj, and between 8 and 9 a.m, fighting was going on 
to the south of Sisamau, an area outlying the city proper.”
198
 Sale reported that “just about then 
[9 a.m.] alarms from outlying mohallas (neighborhoods) began to be received and parties were at 
once sent out from Meston Road as on the previous day.”
199
 Yet, the number of complaints 
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revolving around police inaction continued to increase and the authors of the Kanpur Riots 
Commission Report noted that “almost every witness who came before us had seen instances in 
which murder, loot and arson had been committed in the presence of policemen who had refused 
to take any notice of them.”
200
 Etawah Bazaar also became a site of rioting when a “huge gang 
…burnt several shops [and] killed several Musalmans.”
201
 Vidyarthi hastened to quell the 
violence and recruited Shri Kanhaya Lal to use his lorry as a taxi service for transporting injured 
persons to the hospital. In a meeting held in the Congress Office the day before, rescue work had 
been designated the Congress Party’s recourse to dealing with the riots. Vidyarthi continued to 
“the Muslim lane near Girdhar Das’ house” where a number of Hindus were hiding.
202
 
Accompanying him were Hindu and Muslim volunteers who successfully deflected attacks upon 
Ganeshji by informing his would-be assailants that “Ganeshji had already rescued thirty or 
thirty-five Musalmans.”
203
 Dispatching the thirty Hindus who had been hiding with Lal, 
Vidyarthi proceeded to the Bengali Mohal where both the authors of the British and Kanpur 
Riots Commission Reports asserted that rioters “perpetuated the most horrible atrocities.”
204
 
 In one instance described by both accounts, a gang of Hindus, after setting a house on 
fire, searched for any surviving occupants, dragging them out to butcher them “before the very 
eyes of the witness and her daughter-in-law and child, who were the sole survivors thanks to 
their feigning death by throwing themselves on the heap of corpses. Even so they did not escape 
injury…as the assailants set fire” to the pile of bodies.
205
 The authors of the British Report noted 
Vidyarthi’s efforts to stop the violence; “Mr. Vidyarthi reached this mohalla and successfully 
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assisted in the rescue of a number of other Muslim families in the vicinity.”
206
 As the fervor of 
the violence continued to increase, Vidyarthi continued to “engage in rescue work” according to 
both the British and Kanpur Riots Commission Reports until his death at the hands of a Muslim 
mob. 
207
  
 Vidyarthi, after leaving the Bengali Mohalla, had hastened to Karin ki Chakki, a side 
street in the city proper. There after seeing the successful rescue of a Hindu family, Vidyarthi 
came between two hostile and armed Muslim mobs. A witness with Vidyarthi narrated: “one of 
the Musalmans there whom I recognize cried out: 
This is Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi. Let us kill him, let him not escape… Some 
 Musalmans then ran towards Ganeshji. Ganesji bent his head before them, and said 
 something I could not hear. A man stabbed him in the back. Another attacked him with a 
 khanta. Ganeshji fell down.
208
  
 
Rumors of his death spurred other Congress Party leaders to search for him and the authors of 
the Kanpur Riots Commission Report documented the efforts of Iqbal Krishna Kapoor and Jog to 
find his body that afternoon. In the midst of this tragedy, rioters continued to devastate the city 
and clashes broke out in Gwaltoli, Sadar Bazaar, Shutarkhana, Parmat, and Baconganj, different 
areas of Kanpur. 
 The British response was to post military pickets and dispatch patrols. A picket was 
placed at Kunji Lal’s temple and “two military parties were patrolling all day on either side of 
Meston Road.”
209
 The number of military personnel increased in the afternoon as an Auxillary 
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Force was deployed to Mall Road to avoid the violence from spreading to the Civil Lines. Other 
reinforcements arrived later that afternoon, and by 4:30 the existing pickets were strengthened 
and new pickets set up throughout the city. The effect on the rioters, however, of this increased 
martial force was limited. S. Bhasin, Secretary of the United Provinces Kerana Seva Samiti, a 
Hindu organization, reported that, “houses were being looted in the very presence of the police in 
Bengali Mohal as well as Butcherkhanna…at about 4:30 p.m., I told these constables to arrest the 
robbers but they pleaded want of orders. I told them that these were cognizable offences and no 
order was necessary, but to no effect.”
210
 Describing his own actions during the riot, Sale 
maintained in his testimony: 
I received a number of appeals for aid by letters and telephone. I kept as close liaison as 
possible by telephone and I believe that every possible effort was made to give help to 
private applicants but in view of the widespread nature of the trouble and the scanty 
forces at our disposal it was not possible to satisfy every applicant.”
211
 
 
 Barron also commented on the numerous calls for help: 
During the whole day rumors or reports were coming in from different quarters of the 
city of rioting, looting and arson. If first they were accepted at their face value and parties 
of police were dispatched by lorry to more distant parts or on foot to the nearer ones…the 
parties returned to report that the rumors were entirely unfounded and that all was quiet 
in the locality in which they had been sent.
212
 
 
 That evening saw Barron patrol the city and describe an area that had allegedly been the scene 
of rioting as a deserted street where “we could see no signs of burning houses or of rioting… all 
was perfectly quiet. No shouting could be heard.”
213
 Sale refused to institute Martial Law yet  
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“on the morning of the 26
th
 riots were still continuing in full force, especially in the more 
outlying areas” according to the British Report.
214
 
March 26
th 
 
The 26
th
 proved to be just as calamitous as the 25
th
.
 215
 During the early morning, 
Sisamau, an area outlying the city proper, once more came under attack by both Muslims and 
Hindus. By 8 a.m., Gwaltoli Bazar was in flames and rioters renewed attacks on Parmat. Around 
9 a.m., the Annapura temple at Patkapur was demolished by a fire, a number of houses 
destroyed, and the Juma Mosque damaged.
216
 Baconganj and Colonelganj remained beleaguered 
and the looting of shops, destruction of homes, and murders continued throughout the city. 
Despite the arrival of higher police officials from Lucknow, the situation remained dire. Sale 
commented, “around 10 a.m., a large number of alarm reports continued to be received during 
the day both by me, the Superintendent of Police and the Office Commanding Station, many of 
them were on enquiry found to be false.”
217
 Yet, as the authors of the British Report noted, at 
times, Sale was too quick to dismiss claims of rioting as baseless. The case of Mr. S.M Basheer, 
Barrister-at-Law, exemplified this oversight: 
Early on the 26
th
, Mr. Basheer went to the District Magistrate and then to the 
Superintendent of Police and to the Kotwal for help but unluckily his request fell on deaf 
ears as owing to the previous reports of all being quiet in Parmat [Barron, the Deputy 
Inspector-General of Police and Superintendent of Police had patrolled the main bazaar in 
Parmat and had “found all quiet”] thus no reliance was placed on his statement. By 
midday on the 26
th
, about 19 Muslims had been murdered and a number of houses looted 
and burnt.
218
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Attacks continued in the city proper and outlying areas. Renewed attacks on Sabzimandi from 
the previous day resulted in “a number of murders…committed and several persons severely 
injured.”
219
In Sadar Bazzar, fighting had resumed and “looting was in progress in Lathi 
Mohal.”
220
 In his testimony, Sale described how: 
Rescue parties were organized under the charge of magistrates or police officers and a 
good many people were taken out from houses and hiding places where they had been 
since the riots began. Only then was it fully realized that a ghastly set of murders had 
occurred of people of both communities who were living in groups or singly in the 
middle of people of the other community.
221
 
 
Rescue efforts comprised of implementing more pickets, dividing the city into two circles with a 
Deputy Superintendent of Police patrolling each area and assuming responsibility for the 
“supervision of police arrangements.”
222
 That evening, Barron reported around 5 p.m., “the 
situation appeared much easier. A good number of men were moving about in a moral manner 
and a few shops had opened in the main streets.”
223
  
March 27
th
–30
th
  
 As noted by the British Report, March 27
th
 saw “marked signs of improvement.”
224
 The 
number of areas under attack diminished and rescue workers were largely unmolested as they 
traversed the city, aiding the wounded and preparing bodies for funerary arrangements. Solitary 
acts of violence, however, continued to affect parts of the city. In an attempt to depict how grisly 
the violence had been, the authors of the Kanpur Riots Commission Report included three 
tragedies to “illustrate the horrors that were raging.”
225
 The second of their documented tragedies 
occurred on March 27
th
. Pandit Kanhaiya Lal of Phoolganj recounted how his Muslim neighbors 
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tortured his relative, Batashi, by cutting off the flesh of her heels to take her silver anklets, 
“weighing 120 tolas.”
226
 After throwing her in a well, the rioters murdered the narrator’s wife 
and assaulted him and his father with until they became unconscious. Crimes like these 
continued and the authors of the British Report support these claims though maintaining that the 
frequency and number of such crimes diminished.  
 On March 28
th
, “the situation continued to show a definite improvement with only a few 
murders being reported.”
227
 The authors of both the Congress and British Report recognized the 
efforts of Kirana Seva Samiti, a Hindu organization, as contributing to the restoration of peace. 
According to a report cited in the Kanpur Riots Commission Report, the “Kirana Sewa Samiti 
between the 24
th
 and 29
th
 of March sent 102 dead bodies to the Prince of Wales Hospital, burnt 
60 on the spot under orders of the authorities, sent 140 wounded men, women and children to the 
Prince of Wales Hospital, and rescued 187 families and 86 persons from affected areas.”
228
 The 
efforts of the Congress Party coupled with official endeavors served to end much of the violence. 
By this point, however, Kanpur had been devastated. “Whole mohallas (neighborhoods) lay 
desolate with debris of burn and smouldering houses interspersed….Inside the houses, in the 
lanes, and on public roads, lay dead bodies of human beings in advance stages of 
decomposition.”
229
 It was against this backdrop that volunteers and officials assisted victims and 
evaluated the wreckage. Neighborhoods that had previously been comprised of both Muslim and 
Hindu populations “had practically ceased to exist for the time being” and “whole masses of 
population had shifted their quarters.”
230
 By one estimate, 80,000 people had fled by railway 
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alone in the opening days of the riot.
231
 Yet, shops began to open and both the Congress and 
British Report maintain that Kanpur began to return to normalcy. 
  The 29
th
 and 30
th
 saw further improvements. The arrangements on the 29
th
 for two 
Deputy Magistrates, one Muslim and the other Hindu, to go around in designated areas of the 
city was a measure noted by both Reports as very successful since it resulted in the “cessation of 
the constant shouting at night which had tended to keep up a state of panic.”
232
 British officials 
removed the military pickets and mills began to resume normal hours of operation. Reporting to 
the British Commission, however, Hoon, a British lawyer, dampened the impact of official 
action to end the riots by commenting, “I am convinced that if the combatants had not exhausted 
themselves by fighting, the results would have been even more disastrous.”
233
 Though solitary 
acts of violence continued to affect some parts of the city, by the 30
th
, calm had been restored. It 
is here where the British Report maintains a daily log of events is unnecessary because “the 
situation had been brought fully under control.”
234
 
The Aftermath 
 The Kanpur Riots had resulted in major loss of life and property damage. By the end of 
the riot, the official estimate of the number of casualties was 294, 155 Hindu victims and 119 
Muslims.
235
 However, as N. Gerald Barrier notes in his introduction to Roots of Communal 
Politics, the casualty count was much higher, approximately 400, and the authors of the British 
Report concede that figures may have been higher than the official count. The number wounded 
similarly was underestimated in the British Report. Compared to Barrier’s estimate of 1200 the 
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authors of the British Report only counted 401 injured persons throughout the week-long riot.
236
 
In addition to the human loss was the complete devastation of the city. According to official 
estimates, eighteen mosques, forty-two temples, 248 Hindu houses and 101 Muslim houses were 
burnt or damaged. 
237
 In a statement “showing crimes reported mohalla-wise (neighborhood-
wise)…for the first four days of the riot, over 1,500 crimes were reported in the 28 mohallas.”
238
 
While the number of crimes per mohalla ranged from less than ten per day in some mohallas to 
over a hundred per day in other mohallas, the number of arrests made in each neighborhood was 
proportionally much less.  Hundreds of crimes were reported yet the most arrests made in any 
single day was 66 on the 23
rd
 in the Colonelganj mohalla.
239
 The discrepancy between criminal 
action and police action drew “search-lights from all over India…falling upon Kanpur and 
scrutinizing in a most uncomfortable way the doings of the local officials and the Government 
policy.”
240
 Police inaction became the watchword for the Congress Party and confronting the 
legitimacy of the British government to safeguard the interests of Kanpur citizens, the authors of 
the Kanpur Riots Commission Report called upon riot victims to question its authority.  
Conclusion 
 In their daily log of the events of the riots, both the respective authors of the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report and the British Commission Report used personal anecdotes to describe the 
events of the riots. Yet, both subsumed the narratives of riot participants in their efforts to 
promote their respective officials. The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report followed 
the leaders of the Congress Party in Kanpur as they attempted to quell the riots. The authors 
reported their efforts in detail, calling attention to the individual contributions of each member. 
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Similarly, the British Commission Report described the actions of British officials, focusing on 
preventive measures taken by the District Magistrate and the collaborative efforts of the local 
British Government in Kanpur and the military to put down the riots. In reading the narratives, 
there is a sense of isolation among the people involved. The British Government officials were 
caught up in the too-important business of rearranging troops and pickets to most effectively 
quell the riots without personally being present. The policemen, jointly presented by the Kanpur 
Riots Commission Report and the British Commission Report, as culpable for much of the 
bloodshed because of their inaction, stand aside dispassionately watching atrocity after atrocity. 
The result is a disjointed view both of how the riot took place and of the involvement of the riot 
participants, the unstudied population in both accounts. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
 
IDENTIFYING THE VOICES OF RIOT PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
“I am sure that is just when the riots began, those innumerable self-sacrificing 
Congress volunteers who in Congress processions stood with their bended necks 
ready to receive lathi blows from the police, faced the guns of white soldiers with 
their chests uncovered, and who took pride in ending their lives by lying down before 
the horses of mounted police, had taken their lives in their hands and began 
Satyagraha in every mohalla against people who were busy fighting each other then 
after the martyrdom of ten or twenty such volunteers the disturbance would have 
ended.”
241
   
                                            Syed Aminuddin Haidar, witness to the Kanpur Riots
242
 
 
 
Introduction 
In his memorandum preceding the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, Bhagwan Das 
explained that the Kanpur riots could be seen “as merely an aggravated symptom of the 
disease.”
243
 Happening within weeks after the Benares and Agra riots, the Kanpur riots were 
part of an increasingly violent trend of religious strife.  Viewing the Kanpur riots within this 
context, the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report sought to show how the 1931 
Kanpur riots were a typical example of Hindu-Muslim relations under the British Raj. 
According to them, the British policy of “divide and rule,” was the major factor motivating 
religious riots. To this effect, they presented the events of the Kanpur Riots as a continuation of 
the 293-page history prefacing their account of the outbreak of violence. The Kanpur Riots, the 
authors of the Congress Report argued could not be understood as an isolated incident but 
instead needed to be documented as an example of Hindu-Muslim relations as written in the 
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history included in the Report. Understanding the Kanpur Riots required understanding how 
British rule in India was responsible for setting up the causes of conflict. The authors of the 
Kanpur Riot Commission Report set out to prove that Hindu-Muslim strife was not built into 
Hindu-Muslim relations but rather the result of official (British) manipulation.  
The British Report was formally titled “Findings of the Committee appointed to hold a 
departmental enquiry into the conduct of the subordinate police during the Kanpur riots.” 
Written for the purpose of investigating claims of police inaction, the British Report was the 
official statement of the British Government. It was intended for senior British officials to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the official response to the riots and respond to the numerous 
allegations of police inactivity by Kanpur’s citizens, both European and Indian. Though its 
scope was more limited than the Congress Report, the authors of the British Report used the 
Kanpur Riots to make a statement about Indians and British rule in India. The British authors 
invoked riot participants, citizens of Kanpur unaffiliated with the Congress Party or the British 
Government, to perpetuate two themes common to colonial historiography: that Hindu-Muslim 
relations were primarily characterized by strife and that Indians as a whole were incapable of 
governing themselves. Both private testimonies of British officials in Kanpur and the British 
Commission Report refer to these facets when calling upon riot participants. These assumptions 
are built into the text and their significance lies in the fact that they affect the way in which the 
events of the Kanpur Riots are described. 
In this chapter, I will examine the role of riot participants in both the Congress and 
British Commission Reports. My objective is to show how the stories and voices of riot 
observers became entangled with the ideological agendas of the nationalists in the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report and the colonialists in the British Commission Report. While the authors of 
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the British Report used witness testimonies to a lesser extent than the authors of the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report, both incorporated riot participants to make a political statement. The 
British, in private testimonies in addition to the British Commission Report, called upon riot 
participants to legitimize the necessity for British rule, while the Congress Party authors used the 
voices of riot participants to show how the Congress Party functioned as a mouthpiece for the 
public. In other words, the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report saw their account of 
the Kanpur riots as the public’s story. Their role was simplified to a conveyor of the public’s 
truth. What they failed to consider, however, was how the public’s voice would undermine some 
of their own claims. The voices included in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report had the 
unintended effect of casting doubt on the Congress Party’s claims. The very words the authors of 
the Kanpur Riot Commission Report used to show how they were the people’s representatives 
helped substantiate claims that conflicted with the Congress Party’s agenda. 
The British Portrayal of Riot Participants 
 The aftermath of the Kanpur riots saw not only the creation of a formal British 
Commission Report but also the submission of official testimonies of British officials involved 
in the riots. In a city where “extreme nervousness [continued to] exist on both the [Hindu and 
Muslim] sides and may easily result in panic and a fresh outbreak,” British officials were called 
upon to submit their personal accounts of the Kanpur riots.
244
  District Magistrate J.F Sale, Joint 
District Magistrate Barron, and Superintendent Rogers documented the actions they had taken to 
suppress the violence. The testimonies they produced became part of the official literature of the 
Kanpur riots. They were incorporated into the British Commission Report and recounted in detail 
in local newspapers such as The Leader and The Statesman. On April 21, 1931 the editors of The 
Statesman printed an article entitled “Cawnpore Riots Inquiry: Magistrate’s Story; Why Martial 
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Law was refused.” Two days later, they published extensive coverage of the “Official Inquiry 
into Cawnpore Riots” documenting “charges against the police.”
245
 Coverage in The Leader was 
more extensive. Beginning on April 2
nd
, the editors printed a series of articles detailing the 
findings of the Official Cawnpore Riots Inquiry and quoting verbatim the testimonies of British 
officials involved.
246
 Writing about the challenges they faced individually and the measures they 
took, the three British officials sought to show how they had attempted to quell the riots to the 
best of their capabilities at the time. What stands out, however, is their description of the rioters 
and riot victims. This section will highlight colonial beliefs about Indians while documenting 
how British officials viewed Indian citizens of Kanpur.  
 The British officials involved in the Kanpur riots and the authors of the British 
Commission Report sought to show that the Hindu-Muslim strife was an enduring problem in 
India. In the words of Joint Magistrate Barron, “friction between the two communities is 
unfortunately an ever present problem in India.”
247
 Hindu-Muslim relations had worsened since 
the 1920s and the authors of the British Commission Report illustrate one instance of this trend. 
Quoting Mr. Chatterji, Principal of Christ Church College, Kanpur, they cite his experience as 
representative of increased Hindu-Muslim tension. Chatterji recounted: 
 In my own College, which was made a target of virulent attacks, sometimes 
accompanied by violence, the seventy or eighty Muslim students remain solidly loyal to 
their institution, and most of them showed great pluck in attending College in the face of 
obstruction and intimidation. On one occasion when the mob that…. accompanied the 
Congress picketers assaulted students, the majority of those who received injuries 
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happened to be Muslims. The incident roused much feeling among Muslims in the 
town.
248
  
 
Chatterji’s statement points to the Congress’ culpability in fueling religious tensions. His 
comments are used as part of the explanation for the predisposing causes of the riots and they 
can be used to view how British officials viewed ordinary citizens of Kanpur. The British held 
ordinary citizens of Kanpur responsible, to a limited extent, for the outbreak of violence on 
March 24
th
 1931 because some were involved in Congress activities.  
 The authors of the British Commission Report make the connection between the 
Congress Party and the deterioration of Hindu-Muslim relations stronger in their next usage of a 
riot observer’s remarks. While clarifying that the Congress Party is “discharged of any culpable 
responsibility for the immediate outbreak,” they insinuate, through the words of an Indian citizen 
of Kanpur, that the Congress Party may share some responsibility for the violence, if not 
“culpable responsibility.
249
 They recount how “ Lala Dewan Chand, Principal of the Dayand 
Anglo-Vedic College, told us that when he heard in Basti of the riot he returned at once to 
Kanpur fearful that there might be trouble in Kanpur any day on account of “sympathetic 
contagion.”
250
 Chand feared communal reprisal for violence occurring in nearby areas. Because 
the Congress Party continued with their plan to hold a hartal, the British present the Congress 
Party as out of touch with the concerns of some of Kanpur’s citizens. The authors of the British 
Report maintain that Congress Party leaders should “have been aware of the tense feelings in 
Kanpur as others were.
251
 This barb serves to undermine confidence in the competence of the 
Congress Party and by extension the people they claim to represent, the citizens of Kanpur. The 
authors of the British Commission Report further accentuate this point, contending, “it must have 
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been present to the mind of the Committee that a hartal to the memory of Bhagat Singh would 
particularly stir the imagination of their younger people and it was through the younger people 
that hartals were accomplished, and if need be, enforced.”
252
  Lala Dewan’s words are used to 
castigate the Congress Party and their volunteers without the British authors being completely 
accountable for launching the attack.  
 In his testimony, Barron explicitly faults riot participants for the challenges they faced in 
quelling the violence. Hindus and Muslims, as depicted, are not fit to govern themselves. Barron 
portrays riot observers as a panic-stricken population who hinder official efforts to quell the 
riots. In three instances, Barron makes reference to his supposition that “it appeared to be the 
ambition of every resident of Kanpur to have an armed guard at his door step during the days of 
the riot, irrespective of whether any rioting had taken place in the locality or not.”
253
 Barron 
describes the citizens of Kanpur as interfering with official procedures without contributing to 
efforts to quell the riots. The citizens of Kanpur are helpless and do not possess the know-how to 
take charge of the situation. Responding to criticisms that he had been uncivil to riot victims, 
Barron replied:  
To all and sundry [who made requests for aid] I explained with great patience that we had 
not sufficient men to deal with reports of actual rioting, so none could be spared for 
rescue work in which there was no immediate danger or for protection from fear of 
attack. To such as accepted this answer I was quite civil. To those who made a nuisance 
of themselves by repeatedly asking for quite unnecessary help I had to speak brusquely in 
order to get rid of them and get on with my work.
254
 
 
 The riot observers annoy Barron and frustrate his efforts on their behalf.  His portrayal of the 
people he deals with is unflattering and this impression is further compounded by the way he 
describe what riot observes do during the riots. 
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 In Barron’s testimony, riot observers not only make incessant demands for help but they 
make false statements. In his most detailed example of this type of event, Barron recalled:  
“[On March 28
th
] After returning to the District Magistrate’s bungalow about 5 p.m. a 
leading Kanpur business man arrived in a state of great panic and informed us that his 
house was on fire and his women-folk were being murdered. I went with him to Kallam-
Ka Street and found all quiet and his house untouched. He called his servants and 
demanded to be told where the rioters had gone. The servant asked, “what rioters?” On 
being told “the man who set fire to the house” the servant merely looked bewildered and 
replied “I do not know.” No one has been here since the riots started. The man who led 
me on this errand had previously reported at least half a dozen times that his house was 
in flames. He is B. Krishna Lal Gupta, who gave evidence before this commission, a few 
days ago. I do not quote this as any reflections on Mr. Gupta.”
255
 
 
Barron further explains that he “merely gives [this incident] as an instance of the type of 
information which was being given to us at all hours of the day and night by telephone…or in 
person.”
256
 What is notable about Barron’s account is that he recalls exactly what everyone said, 
signified by his use of direct quotes, and his characterization of both the servant and B. Krishna 
Gupta in stock terms. In other words, the servant and B. Krishna Gupta fulfill their roles: the 
former as a “bewildered” bystander and the latter as an example of the panic-stricken population. 
While this is the most thoroughly described individual example of riot observers purportedly 
misrepresenting their situation, it is only one of three examples Barron cites. More characteristic 
of how Barron presents the actions of riot observers is reflected in his description of an incident 
that occurred on March 25
th
:  
About 11:30 p.m., a telephone message was received that arson and rioting were in 
progress at Parmat….Mr. Bell, Mr. Rogers, and I left by car. We stopped at the police 
guard to follow us. We then went to Parmat and drove the whole way… We could see 
no signs of burning houses or of rioting. The street was deserted and all was perfectly 
quiet. No shouting could be heard. A patrol of U.P. Light Horne was just leaving the 
locality when we arrived at the Police out post. They too had nothing to report… So we 
concluded that this report was merely another false rumor and we left for the city.
257
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Here, the riot observers are neither seen nor heard. They are an inconvenience that British 
officials have to cope with. This view of riot participants is evidenced in Barron and Sale’s 
testimony with the latter taking the characterization one step further by speculating what riot 
participants would have done in certain conjectural situations. 
 Justifying their actions during the Kanpur riots, both Barron and Sale make assumptions 
of what the reactions of riot participants would have been to hypothetical scenarios. Their 
motive is to show how no matter what actions could have been taken during the riots, the 
consequences would have been the same. Sale observes, “I think some of the persons who at the 
time clamored for Martial Law would in a few days have begun to complain bitterly about 
it.”
258
 The effect of Sale’s statement is to show how riot participants will have the same 
complaints regardless of what official action is taken. In the same way that Sale purports to 
predict the behavior of riot observers, Barron uses the same technique to ward off criticism. He 
states, “it is alleged that for the first three or four days the authorities did absolutely nothing to 
quell the riots. In reply to this I can only suggest that if the persons who have made these 
allegations had found occasions to appear in the city during these four days they might have told 
a very different story.”
259
 Though his construction is not as strong, “might have” compared to 
Sale’s utterance of “would have,” the effect is the same. Barron suggests that under a 
hypothetical set of circumstances, riot observers would have acted in a certain way, told a “very 
different story.” While Barron’s remarks are not as disparaging as Sale’s, both purport to draw 
conclusions on riot observers’ behavior based on their own biases. The portrayal of riot 
observers that emerges is neither provable—Sale and Barron are conjecturing—nor contributory 
to an understanding of the events of the riots.  
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 The final way Barron and Sale invoke riot observers is to show that they do not 
understand the feasible ways of quelling a riot. Both the District Magistrate and the Joint 
Magistrate blame riot observers for failing to grasp why certain measures would not help during 
the course of the riot. Specifically, they address complaints of lack of firing by police and claims 
of ineffective pickets. Throughout their testimonies, Barron and Sale maintain that very limited 
opportunities existed to fire upon rioters and that pickets were indispensable in quelling the 
violence. Barron recounted: 
About 8:30 or 9 a.m. [on March 25
th
], a report was received that crowds were gathering 
on both sides of the Moulganj. The [superintendent] and I rushed to the spot by car… 
Although we had no more than 4 or 5 men with us the crowd just…melted away and we 
were utterly unable to catch a single one of them. This is typical of what happened 
throughout the riot. On the appearance of the police or the military, the rioters fled as fast 
as their legs would carry them. One witness M. Marvin Prasad Nigars has cited this 
incident as an instance of police inaction where a mob could have been and should have 
been dispersed by force.
260
 
 
Elaborating on his comment, Barron stated, “I am unable to understand his meaning. Mr. Rogers 
and I were on the spot. Within two or three minutes and on our arrival the mobs fled. If Marvin 
Prasad means we should have fired on the crowd I am unable to agree with him. I know of no 
order, which justifies us in on firing on a fleeing crowd.”
261
 Barron censures Marvin Nigars for 
complaining about the lack of an action Barron considers inappropriate. Barron finds his 
criticism incomprehensible and the impact of his statement is to suggest that riot observers had 
no understanding of what feasible measures could be taken. Sale echoes Barron’s sentiments in 
his statement on the “Alleged Lack of Strictness by the Military and the Police.” He maintains, 
“neither I nor any of the Magistrates or Police Officers were reluctant to order firing in any case 
where it was justified under the rules…I do not think that the critics were fully acquainted with 
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the exact circumstances of the riots or the rules bearing on the subject.”
262
 From Sale’s 
testimony, the riot participants appear ignorant in common law. Their criticisms are irrational 
because they put forth unreasonable expectations of what the police and Magistrates could have 
done. Barron and Sale’s testimony show that even when riot participants attempted to take a 
more active stance in discussing the riots-by criticizing police inaction and suggesting other 
steps-they were unable to suggest feasible measures. 
 Without negating any of their earlier statements regarding Hindu-Muslim strife in India, 
the authors of the British Commission Report weaken Barron and Sale’s depiction of riot 
observers. While bearing in mind that the “civil disobedience movement accentuated the 
estrangement between the two communities,” the authors of the British Commission Report call 
into question the professional competence of the District Magistrate to end the riots.  They 
support claims of police inaction during the course of the violence. Remarking:  
Every class of witness before us who gave expression otherwise to widely different 
points of view agreed in this one respect, that the police showed indifference and 
inactivity in dealing with the various incidents in the riot. These witnesses include 
European businessmen, Muslims and Hindus of all shades of opinion, military officers, 
the Secretary of the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, representatives of the Indian 
Christian community, and even Indian officials,
263
  
 
they contend, “it is impossible to ignore such unanimity of evidence.”
264
 They further highlight 
the ineffectiveness of pickets and with regard to lathi (club) charges, saying, “we think these 
charges might have been pressed home more.”
265
 Their words substantiate the claims of 
witnesses that Barron and Sale both decry. While castigating Barron and Sale, however, the 
authors of the British Commission Report do not overturn their assumptions about Indians. 
Hindu-Muslim strife still characterizes Hindu-Muslim relations. 
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 What is apparent in British official documents is the specific way in which they invoke 
riot participants. Both private testimonies and the British Commission Report use riot 
participants to underscore traits of Indians that had been previously used to justify British rule in 
India. Riot participants are called upon to evidence British claims rather than document the 
events of the riots. The effect is that riot participants become superfluous to understanding the 
events of the Kanpur Riots and instead become important in understanding how British officials 
view Indians.  
Appropriating the Voices of Rioters 
 In the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, the anecdotes of riot participants form the bulk 
of the narrative of the events of the Kanpur riots. In comparison to the British Commission 
Report in which the authors quote only three Indian witnesses, the authors of the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report quote sixty-seven different people in their narrative of the riots.
266
 The 
authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report name and use the words of more than twenty-
two times the number of Indian witnesses that the authors of the British Report employ. The 
difference is stark. The dissimilar ways in which the two Reports are written evince the different 
ways in which they are intended to be read. While the British Report was meant for higher 
British officials, the Kanpur Riot Commission Report was written to educate the public. Their 
efforts to do so took the form of using the public’s voice to narrate the violence of the riots. By 
presenting the events of the riots in the words of riot participants, the Congress Party became the 
intermediaries, acting as the mouthpiece for the public. The public’s words were the Congress 
Party’s words and the Congress Party’s words were the words of the people. 
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 The most obvious way riot participants are used is to provide a context for the events of 
the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. As the authors of the Report recount the incidents of the 
riots, the Kanpur Riots emerge as a series of efforts by Congress Party officials to quell the riots. 
Riot participants are invoked to the extent that Congress leaders are not operating within a 
vacuum. The narratives of riot participants are used to document the actions of Congress Party 
leaders. The beginning pages see Congress Party leaders rushing around the city attempting to 
minimize the disturbance caused by the hartal. G.G Jog “successfully dissuades the 
Mohammedans from throwing stones… and successfully pacifies Hindu and Muslim crowds.”
267
 
Later that day, Shri Iqbal Kapoor and Vidyarthi are successful in their endeavor to force a Hindu 
crowd gathered near Babu Mangli Prasad’s gate to cease “throwing stones at a Musalman 
crowd.”
268
 Congress leaders appeal to the Kotwali In-Charge (superintendent of police) and are 
dismayed when he ignores their requests to address the violence and instead, “smiling, turns his 
face to the reverse side of the speaker at every appeal.”
269
 The riot participants are incorporated 
in this story only as the population on behalf of whom these actions are taking place. Their 
statements throw light upon the actions of Congress Party leaders and depict them collectively as 
the public’s saviors.  
 As the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report document the increasing violence 
of the Kanpur Riots, riot participants become hapless victims. Their place in the narrative 
reinforces the perception of Congress Party leaders as heroes and their rescue efforts as a 
testament to the courage of Congress Party workers. Prefacing their narrative of the events of the 
second and remaining days of the riots, the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report 
editorialize how “the terrific outburst on the 24
th
 had altogether stunned responsible sections of 
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the residents of Kanpur, and the open and deliberate inaction of the Police still more increased 
their feelings of helplessness.”
270
 The personal anecdotes of riot participants and the involvement 
of Congress Party officials showcase the Congress Party as the protector and defender of the 
people. Munshi Abdul Haq, owner of the biggest hosiery shop in Kanpur, recounts how the 
police did not interfere with the rioters looting his shop and instead, the duty falls to Ganesh 
Vidyarthi:  
Mr. Ram Karan Sinha, Officer-in-Charge of the Kotwali, with a Deputy Collector, who 
was putting on a hat and knickers and twenty to twenty-five head constables and 
constables together with eight or ten mounted police were present at the crossing and 
were seeing all that was happening at my shop. I told Mr. Ram Kiran Sinha that the 
doors and locks of my shop were being broken, and requested him to save my shop. He 
replied that he could not do anything. In the meantime, my shops was actually broken 
into and, and goods inside began to be looted. I continued to do my utmost to draw the 
attention of Mr. Ram Karan Sinha and the Deputy Collector towards, it but each time, 
they invariably replied, “We cannot do anything.” After about half an hour or three-
quarters of an hour, the loot suddenly stopped. On enquiry, I learnt that Ganeshji had 
reached my shop and had driven away from there people who were looting it.
 271
  
 
The intervention of a prominent Congress Party leader, Vidyarthi, saves Haq’s store. Officials 
standing by “cannot do anything” while Vidyarthi single-handedly stops the looting. Though it is 
Sinha’s job to act and he has enough constables to perform his duty, he does not. Officials 
associated with the British Government, “the police officer in charge, the Deputy Collector, the 
policemen, and the mounted sowars were all standing and seeing the fun.”
272
 Haq castigates the 
officials for their inaction. His statement exemplifies a trend in the Kanpur Riot Commission 
Report: while Congress workers work tirelessly to aid riot victims, officials stand idly by. S. 
Bhasin, Advocate Secretary, UP Kerana Seva Samiti relates, “the houses were being looted in 
the very presence of the police in Bengali Mohal as well as Butcherkhanna. The constables were 
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merely watching….”
273
 Discussing an incident of looting he had witnessed, Sri Bari Nath 
Kapoor declares that: 
 This was being done before the very eyes of two Deputy Collectors, who were standing 
 at a distance of about 60 yards from the shops, with the City Kotwal. Although a strong 
 police force was at their disposal, they did nothing to stop the loot….The constables, 
 instead of protecting the shop, were eating English sweetmeats and using vegetable oil 
 which they took from the shop.”
274
 
 
 In all three accounts, riot participants criticize the police for not fulfilling their duty. In the final 
case, the officers take part in the crime. This facet of officers engaging in criminal activity 
figures heavily in the following set of quotations the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission 
Report include. 
 From being inactive during the riots, the police discredit themselves further when they 
collude with rioters. Witness statements in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report document how 
constables commit crimes against riot victims. The inclusion of this set of quotations is notable 
for two reasons. First, the authors of the Congress Party insert themselves into the situation when 
they describe how constables abuse riot victims using Congress Party rhetoric and second, they 
use this rhetoric to turn the violence into an act of the British Government against the Civil 
Disobedience Movement. The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report employ witness 
statements to make this point. Pandit Mathura Prasad Bajpei, a “well-known citizen of Kanpur” 
recounts how:  
The police, in addition to the observance of non-intervention policy, sometimes helped 
themselves in filling their pockets and sometimes in taking men seeking their help and 
protection to the quarters where the Badmashes were stationed, and asking them to give 
that person Swaraj, meaning thereby that they were to be belabored, which they did freely 
and to their heart’s content.
275
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Swaraj, one of the cornerstones of the Civil Disobedience Movement, literally meaning “self-
rule,” functions as a word for abuse. In his statement, Shri Ram Bharose of Baconganj 
corroborates Bajpei’s statement. He relates how, “two of the policemen with us, one belonging to 
the armed police and the other to the civil police, said to the crowd, ‘these men want Swaraj.’ 
Some people from the crowd asked the police, it is your order we give them Swaraj? Then the 
two policemen said, ‘Yes, give them Swaraj.’ Then some people from the crowd began striking 
us with lathis (clubs), ballams (spears), khantas (axes), etc.”
276
 Two witnesses condemn the 
police. The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report only function as the medium by 
which these witnesses are able to make their statement.  
 While vilifying officials, the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report use witness 
statements to contrast their behavior with the actions of the most prominent Congress member in 
Kanpur, Ganesh Vidyarthi, President of the United Provinces Provincial Congress Committee. 
Revered as the only man who would be able to restore peace, Ganesh Vidyarthi becomes a 
model for all Congress Party workers. His efforts to rescue inhabitants of violence stricken 
neighborhoods are recorded in great detail and in describing his various endeavors, the authors of 
the Kanpur Riot Commission Report call upon an eyewitness to describe “Ganeshji’s Last 
Sacrifice.” He writes: 
On the 25
th
 March, when Ganeshi reached Patkapur he was bareheaded and 
barefooted. There he appealed to both Hindus and Musalmans to live amicably….As 
soon as they entered [a house near Bengali Mohal] they saw a head separated from the 
trunk, and the dead body of a child which had been pierced together  with a spear. 
Seeing this Ganeshji wept loudly, and said, “Oh God! Destroy these evil doers.” 
Chhotey Khan who heard him crying like this was so much affected by Ganeshji’s 
words that he also began to weep. Others began to weep. Ganeshji clung to Chhotey 
Khan and both of them wept.
 277
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The witness uses emotionally laden terms to describe Vidyarthi’s reaction to the violence. In 
contrast to the devil-may-care, criminal behavior of the police, Vidyarthi and his followers 
demonstrate real grief toward the victims of riot atrocities. Vidyarthi, through the words of an 
eyewitness, emerges as a beloved hero whose reaction to the violence is shared by the people 
who accompany him. Their grief affects him and his horror at the violence stirs them. 
Juxtaposing testimonies of witnesses who recall Vidyarthi’s commitment to ending the riots with 
statements decrying the inaction of the police, the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission 
Report emphasize the stark differences between the two groups.  
 Going hand-in-hand with the riot participants’ role in extolling Ganeshji is their role in 
demonstrating that Hindu-Muslim relations have not been permanently rancorous. Shri Kanshaya 
Lal recounts, “Ganeshji came to my house with these volunteers and five or six others. Ganeshji 
insisted that unless I first fed the Musalmans and gave them water to drink with my own utensils, 
he [Ganeshji] would not take water at my place. At this I gave the Musalmans with us water in 
my own tumbler and then took Ganeshji to the pipe inside.”
278
 The authors of the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report call upon riot participants to show that the British conception of 
longstanding enmity is false. By token of his position, Vidyarthi is able to enjoin Hindus and 
Muslims to disregard societal strictures pertaining to religion. The words of witnesses are used to 
recount Vidyarthi’s influence and while in this particular incident, he is the main character, 
Vidyarthi is not the architect behind every moment of Hindu-Muslim unity. Riot participants, 
themselves, broach the issue of sectarian strife and the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission 
Report call upon them to overturn assumptions that religious antagonism is built into Hindu-
Muslim relations. 
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 The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report use riot participants to evidence 
ideological claims they set forth in opposition to the British. In a section entitled, “The Silver 
Lining,” the authors of the Report include “typical cases” of Hindu-Muslim partnership. These 
cases are divided into three categories: first, when influential leaders intervened to stop 
communal violence; second, when members of a neighborhood collaborated to protect both 
Hindus and Muslims from attacks; and third, when individuals took it upon themselves to rescue 
riot victims at risk of personal injury.
279
 As seen through the words of riot participants, the duty 
or motivation to conciliate Hindus and Muslims was not limited to any particular part of the 
population. Riot participants, across all strata of society, contribute to efforts to end sectarian 
strife. The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report relate the account of Abid Husain, a 
Muslim resident of Colonelganj who “gave shelter to a number of Hindu families.” They report: 
“at great personal risk, he often went out of his house and remonstrated with both Hindus and 
Musalmans not to fight. Sometimes he succeeded, and sometimes, he got beaten in reply. On 
several occasions, we are told, Hindus and Musalmans, who had come to fight, parted after 
embracing each other on account of Abid Husain’s touching appeals (my emphasis).
280
 Husain 
becomes a hero through the course of the riots and his story is conveyed to the authors of the 
Kanpur Riot Commission Report, not formulated by the latter. His anecdote is a case example of 
riot participants assuming responsibility to end the riots.  
 The number of individual cases cited in the Congress Report demonstrates the limits of 
sectarian violence. The authors “casually quote” the incidents they record, noting that “we mean 
no injustice to the larger number of cases known and unknown to us, many of which may be 
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deserving of much greater credit.”
281
 What is common to many of the accounts is how the 
testimonies of other witnesses are used to support the claims. The authors of the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report distance themselves from substantiating claims, instead relying upon riot 
participants to do so. Relating an example of the first category, the Congress Party authors write, 
“Syed Ahmad Husain, an old man and an owner of many houses in Anwarganj, protected the life 
and property of his fifty-five Hindu tenants including men, women and children, and also 
provided them with food at his own cost, during the days of the riot. His tenants acknowledge his 
generosity” (my emphasis).
 282
 Similarly, they recount how “Shri Ram Ratan Gupta testifies that 
in Sadar Bazar, about 50 Musalman families were bottled up amidst a population of about 25,000 
Hindus, and that “not a single Muslman was injured in that area.”He says that the credit for this 
is also due to Shri Ratan Singh” (my emphasis).
283
 Finally, “A Musalman named Mirzapur 
Ayub, in Farrashkhana, together with some other Musalman friends of the Mohalla, gave shelter 
to and protected the lives of 283 Hindu men, women and children. The list is in possession of 
Mirza Ayub and was confirmed by Hindu witnesses present on the spot…”
284
 (my emphasis) In 
all three anecdotes, riot participants present and evidence examples of Hindu-Muslim unity. 
Their accounts are self-sufficient in the sense that the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission 
Report do not see a need to editorialize their remarks. The anecdotes, as they are presented in the 
text, are numbered sequentially and there is no space for editorial comments. After presenting 
over twenty-seven anecdotes, however, the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report 
include themselves in their narrative.
285
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 Describing the atmosphere of the city in the aftermath of the violence, the authors of the 
Kanpur Riot Commission Report call upon riot participants to openly disavow two assumptions 
justifying British rule. They write:  
During our local inspections and enquiries, small crowds of Hindus and Muslims used to 
naturally gather around us. While we questioned, their heads would grow hot and 
recriminations would begin. Then we used to ask them, do you really hate each other? At 
this, they would become silent, hang their heads, and after a while sigh and say, “The 
CID have caused the fighting.”
286
  
 
Both Hindus and Muslims maintain that the British Secret Service is accountable for the 
religious violence. Their statement overturns two reasons given for the necessity of British rule 
in India. The CID’s purported involvement makes the state morally illegitimate while 
additionally undermining the argument that Hindu-Muslim relations have always been 
characterized by strife. The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report first present the 
words of riot participants before surmising that, “their [the people’s] faith in the Government had 
been shaken greatly. Their faith in the Congress remained.”
287
 Their conclusion comes after the 
point has already been established by the people’s words. The people have made this discovery 
about the Government and the Congress Party authors are conveying their finding.  
 The final way riot participants are incorporated into the Kanpur Riot Commission Report is 
to substantiate claims that are otherwise unverified. Most notably, riot participants discuss the 
British Government’s failure to quell the riots and their encouragement of the violence. In a 
section entitled, “The Official at Work,” the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report 
present the testimony of an unnamed witness who recounts how British officials knew of the 
riots and did not act. “On the 20
th
 of March at about 8pm, when I went to Chandoo-khana, a 
Muslim quarter, a woman from inside came to open the door. She opened the door and at once 
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told me not to come there for 4 or 5 days as there was soon going to be a quarrel between Hindus 
and Mohemmadans.”
288
 Her information came from a subordinate official, “B” who purportedly 
was setting Hindus and Muslims against each other and had given orders to a non-official who 
informed the woman that “whatever happens, we have to carry out what we are asked to” despite 
“that the quarrel may increase, many may be killed and we may have to grieve.”
289
 In addition to 
anecdotal evidence, the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report present witness 
testimonies that blame the British for the long-term causes of the riot. Mausalana Hasrat Mohanj, 
a “prominent communal leader,” states, “I do not believe in the Tanzim Programme, because this 
movement has been started at the instance of the Government and some of its leading spirits are 
connected with the CID.”
290
  His assertion is supported by the testimony of “a gentleman, who 
was one of the early organizers of the Tanzim movement in Kanpur ”
291
 The unnamed witness 
“tells us [the authors of the Report] that “this Tanzim Movement was given money simply with 
this object, that the Muslims may not join the Congress.”
292
 Both witnesses contend the 
government has an interest in embittering Hindu-Muslim relations. The two statements call into 
question the legitimacy of the state by insinuating the Government had a role in promoting strife. 
Together the two assertions allow the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report to write, 
“if we could have detailed information as to how the Secret Service Funds of the Government are 
spent, much light would be thrown on matters.”
293
 The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission 
Report ask for governmental accountability and they back their request with evidence from two 
witnesses. 
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  The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report move away from using witness 
testimonies to questioning the British Government’s involvement in the Tanzim Movement to 
ascertaining their culpability. They write, “we questioned one of the prominent witnesses who, 
according to the general belief and also according to his own admission, was one of the principal 
organizers of the [Tanzeem] movement in Kanpur, whether the Government was helping the 
movement financially either directly or through third parties. His reply was, ‘I cannot deny it.’
294
 
What is interesting about the witnesses’ statement is that he simply affirms a positive response to 
the question without using any of his own words. From using the words of a witness to confirm 
suspicions that the Government helped engineer the Tanzim Movement, the authors of the 
Kanpur Riot Commission Report make the same inference about the immediate cause of the 
riots. They use the words of Shiakh Ghazi Khizr Muhammad Sahib to claim that the instigators 
of the riots were “secret agents of the CID.”
295
 In his own words, Shiakh Ghazi Muhammad is 
“morally sure,” that the Government had a role in the immediate breakout of violence.
296
 Both 
witness statements gradually build up a case against the Government and British officials’ 
culpability becomes increasingly evident through the words of the witnesses cited. Hoon, another 
witness quoted in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, castigates British officials for their 
inadequate response to the violence. He declares:  
If it is suggested that the communal riots on the 24
th
 took the authorities by surprise, I 
would submit that proposition is wholly untenable. That communal tension was on the 
rise, that Mohemmadans had inadvertently got themselves mixed up with aggressive 
propaganda against the Hindus, that the Mohemmadans had in their possession a large 
number of weapons, …..are facts fully known to the Collector and the district authorities 
before the riot broke out. …His want [the District Magistrate’s] of preparation to meet 
the contingency was simply inexcusable.
297
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Deploring the official efforts to quell the riots, Hoon, a European resident of Kanpur, fortifies the 
authors’ case against the British authorities. His observation coupled with the two previous 
witness statements showcase the British Government in Kanpur as morally illegitimate. The 
mounting evidence the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report level against British 
officials shows riot participants making these claims and highlights the Congress’ role as an 
intermediary between their words and the larger public. 
 The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report invoke the words of riot participants to 
describe the riots. By doing so, they become the mouthpiece for the public. Every claim the 
authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report make is corroborated by anecdotes and 
impressions of riot participants. The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report are involved 
to the extent that they are formatting how the rioters’ stories reach the public. The question, then, 
remains to what extent do the authors of the Report accurately interpret the voices of riot 
participants? 
Sifting through Words and Voices 
What is apparent in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report is that the way the authors 
phrased their questions influenced the responses they received from riot observers. The authors 
failed to consider, however, that the public’s voice could weaken some of their own political 
claims. Some riot participants pointed to sectarian mobilization as a predisposing cause for 
conflict and because their testimonies, to some extent, held the Congress Party culpable, they had 
their comments qualified by the authors of the Report or omitted completely.  
 The Kanpur Riot Commission Report was appended by three notes. The first, authored by 
Das and Sunderlal, was largely a discourse on majority and minority rights as they related to 
Hindus and Muslims. The second, by Sunderlal alone, added a discussion of Christianity and its 
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teachings to the history included in the Report, and the third was a note of dissent by Maulana 
Zafarul-Mulk. The final note was the most problematic and in a memorandum to Sirdar 
Vallbhbhai Patel, President of the All-India Congress Committee, New Delhi, Das wrote: 
It is with very great reluctance that I add here a few words of explanation on one point, 
regarding procedure, which my esteemed colleague Maulana Zaraful-Mulk has raised in 
his Note. He says that certain passages, which he reproduced in his Note “were deleted 
after that had once been discussed and passed by the whole Committee, and adds, 
“When I received the fair copy of the Report I protested against this extraordinary 
procedure and am constrained to say neither satisfactory reasons were given nor the 
deleted passages were restored, even on my request.
298
 
 
Das explains that after Zafarul-Mulk had left Benares, “practically the whole Report was revised 
and re-arranged,” noting, however, that he did not anticipate any controversy with the final 
version of the Report.
299
 Zafarul–Mulk’s complaints revolved around the interviews of thirty 
Congress members whose statements were later omitted in the final draft of the Report. Zafarul-
Mulk produces excerpts from nine of the witnesses in his Note, all of which decry the 
‘communalist’ outlook affecting members of the Congress Party.  He cites, “one gentlemen says: 
‘men who are absolutely above Hindu-Muslim feeling are a microscopic minority-in the 
Congress organization here. Not more than two or three-the rest are all defensive communalists 
and not offensive communalists...’
 300
 By “defensive communalists,” Zaraful-Mulk refers to 
Hindus who believe that Hindus need to be organized in defensive organizations against 
Muslims. “Offensive communalists” are those Hindus who actively seek confrontation with 
Muslims. A third witness quoted by Zaraful-Mulk stresses this distinction. He testifies:  
Out of the thirty prominent Congressmen in the town, there are all grades of people with 
regard to communal feeling. I think two or three of these can be said to be absolutely 
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above Hindu-Muslim feeling. About ten to fifteen have some slight Hindu tinge in 
them…Two or three are aggressive communalists, and the rest ten or twelve are 
communalists of defensive character. They do not mean any harm to the other 
community, but they do believe in Hindus organizing themselves for defence.
301
  
 
Witnesses cited by Zaraful-Mulk corroborate each others’ statements. While the figures they cite 
do not exactly correlate, there is a general consensus between the witnesses cited that members 
of the Congress Party share some sort of defensive communalism. “An eighth says: ‘of thirty 
prominent Congressmen in Cawnpore, I believe roughly about 5 per cent are absolutely above 
communal feeling. A similar number are aggressive communalists, and the remaining 90 per cent 
are of various shades, but are mostly defensive communalists.’
302
 The witnesses depict Congress 
Party members as drastically different than the accepting, religious tolerant heroes of the Kanpur 
riots the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report showcase them to be.  
 Congress Party members blame other members in their organization for contributing to 
Hindu-Muslim tensions. Recognizing that the witness testimonies would weaken the credibility 
of the Congress, Das justified its exclusion on the grounds that:  
Besides the consideration that they were likely to produce a wrong impression, outside 
their setting, and without much further explanation, what finally influenced the 
members, who remained behind in Benares to revise and arrange the Report as a whole 
in the month of September, to drop them, was the consideration that the deposition were 
taken in camera, that the witnesses left it to the discretion of the Committee whether the 
evidence should not be used or should be used and in what way.
303
 
 
Das’ statement is forthright. His open disclosure that the jurisdiction of whether to use the 
testimonies of riot participants remained with the Committee highlights his recognition of the 
potential threat the words of riot participants can cause. While recognizing the significance of the 
statements, however, Das dismissed it, saying: 
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 The question [of whether to include the testimonies] was one of what might be called 
 technical propriety. They signify only this that many of the Cawnpore Congress workers 
 were not able to rise to that high level of being superior to all orthodoxy, and of loving all 
 mankind irrespective of creed, which was attained by Ganesh Vidyarthi...
304
  
 
Yet, the testimonies cast doubt upon the claims of the Congress Party to be the party of perfect 
diversity. That is, the party that represents all Indians regardless of caste or creed. The voices of 
riot participants make this point and Das’ efforts to undermine their importance falls short when 
the content of Zaraful-Mulk’s note is considered.  
 Zaraful-Mulk’s note speaks to why sectarian mobilization was dangerous to the Congress 
Party. Highlighting discrepancies between the authors’ of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report 
claims and the statements of its party members, Zaraful-Mulk made the words of these Congress 
Party men a liability. By answering the question, “out of the thirty prominent Congressmen in 
Cawnpore, how many do you think are absolutely above communal feeling, etc.?” the witnesses 
defamed the people to whom the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report attributed the 
end of the riots.
305
 They presented a muddied view of the Kanpur riots where British guilt could 
not be assigned easily because of possible Congress culpability. The authors of the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report had pointed to their party members as being free from religious intolerance 
yet the effect of these witnesses’ statements was to present a contradiction. The testimonies, in 
the older version of the Report, reflected even more negatively on the Congress Party because 
they were used to illustrate how the Nationalist Movement had worsened religious relations. In 
the older version of the report, the witness statements preceded the later omitted comment, “in 
such an atmosphere, and with such men at the helm, was the C.D. Movement started in 
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Cawnpore.”
306
 The implication was clear; the Civil Disobedience Movement bred sectarian strife 
according to the Movement’s own followers.  
 While Zaraful-Mulk’s note openly questioned Congress Party members’ participation in 
sectarian activities, witnesses whose statements remained in the final version of the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report did not make such strong claims. Rather, their testimonies did not resonate 
completely with the authors’ of the Kanpur Riot Commission Reports views. Their accounts are 
notable for two reasons. First, the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report mention or 
include references to the process of interviewing and second, because two out of the three 
upcoming testimonies are qualified by editorial comments. All three testimonies, in varying 
degrees, however, point to sectarian strife, and in the final testimony, to the potential culpability 
of the Congress Party as contributing to religious tension. 
  While discussing predisposing causes of the riots, two witnesses described sectarian 
strife as a factor. Senior Vice-Chairman Hafiz Muhammad Siddiq noted that the introduction of 
separate electorates in the Kanpur Municipality, whereby Hindus and Muslims cast ballots 
exclusively for candidates of their faith, was a cause of anxiety. Although recommending a joint 
electorate, Siddiq highlighted one concern: “the one thing that I am anxious to be sure through 
these reservations or safeguards is that no man who is either of narrow communalistic mentality 
or who is a sycophant of the other community should get a chance of being elected.”
307
 Siddiq’s 
comments were innocuous; his statement suggested only that people with a religiously intolerant 
bent could be elected and this result would be problematic. Yet the authors of the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report chose to qualify his testimony with the remark, “closely questioned he 
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[Siddiq] said that ultimately the ‘Hukumat’ i.e. the Government was responsible for all these 
communal troubles.”
308
 Though Siddiq’s assertions were inoffensive, that they did not point to 
the British Government as playing a role in worsening religious tensions was troublesome for the 
authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. They deemed it necessary to draw attention 
away from the fact that Siddiq was wary of “men of narrow communalistic mentality” and 
instead ensure that he explicitly blamed the British Government. Siddiq’s testimony, however, 
revealed his fear of sectarian mobilization despite the authors’ attempt to overshadow this part of 
his statement.  
 In a similar manner, the testimony of Fida Ahmad Khan Sahib Sherwani called attention 
to sectarian strife.  He stated, “I add significant experiences of mine during the riots which have 
not been covered by answers to these questions. My impression is that the riots started on the 
basis of strained communal feelings; but soon they developed into hooliganism and goonda 
(gangster) rule…”
309
 Noting that the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report omitted 
questions whose answers could have revolved around sectarian mobilization, Sherwani put forth 
his view that “strained communal feelings” played a role in the outbreak of violence. What his 
comment does is cast light upon a cause of the riot considered by riot participants as important 
but not delved into in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report.  
 While qualifying statements that reference sectarian strife as a cause of the riots, the 
authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report do include one direct attack upon the Congress 
Party by a witness. Noor-i-Illahi’s testimony castigates the Congress Party for their organization 
of a hartal. “In his written statement in English,” Noor-i-Illahi recounted:  
  [On March 24
th
] I went to the adjoining shop for consultation, and there the news was re-
 confirmed that the Congress Hindus were bent upon using extreme force today if the 
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 Muslims are not going to surrender…. All of us agreed to upon the seriousness of the 
 situation created by the Congress and decided to close down the shops having in view the 
 safety of our shops and of our lives.
310
  
 
Although his comment is not followed by any editorial remarks, the authors of the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report convey their doubts of the authenticity of Noor-i-Illahi’s claims by 
characterizing him “as an example of extreme Muslim sensitiveness.”
311
 This depiction of Noor-
i-Illahi serves to discount his claims as being biased. What is notable about Noor-i-Illahi’s 
comment, however, is his association of the Congress Party with Hindus and their alliance 
against Muslims. Noor-i-Illahi directly addresses the issue of sectarian mobilization and his 
comments reveal, along with the other two testimonies recounted, two conclusions. First, the 
authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report strove to minimize the importance of sectarian 
mobilization as a cause of the riot, and second, that it was a widely shared sentiment unable to be 
articulated through the responses demanded by the authors.  
 What was omitted and editorialized in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report revealed what 
riot participants thought. The voices of riot participants, which the authors of the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report strove to cast as part of their own platform, pointed to sectarian mobilization 
as an important cause of the riots and one in which the participation of the Congress Party was 
muddy. While the authors of the Report dealt with these incriminations by either completely 
excluding the evidence or attacking the proponent of the claim, they could not nullify their 
damaging effect. Although the comments, for the most part, did not directly refute the 
conclusions of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, they did call into question the ability of the 
Congress Party to be unequivocally viewed as the heroes of the Kanpur riots. That, in itself, was 
a conclusion the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report would not recognize. 
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Conclusion   
 The respective authors of the British Commission Report and the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report intersected in their usage of riot participants. Both deemed riot participants a 
necessary component of their retelling of the Kanpur Riots. By invoking them in the text, each 
set of authors hoped to promote their respective ideological aims to the detriment of the other. 
For their part, the British laid out certain assumptions they held that they believed governed 
Hindu-Muslim relations in colonial India. The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report 
used the voices of riot participants to refute these assumptions and in doing so, strove to show 
how the people, and not the authors of the Report, were making the argument. While the riot 
participants did overturn the assumptions, they also impugned the Congress Party to a certain 
extent. The Congress Party, as depicted through the words of witnesses cited in the “Note of 
Dissent,” was not wholly free from religious antagonism. Witnesses whose testimonies were 
included in the Report supported these allegations, pointing to sectarian mobilization as a 
contributing cause of the Kanpur Riots. Together, these two sets of witness statements called into 
question the portrayal of Congress Party members during the Kanpur Riots. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The paradox between the Kanpur Riots and the Congress Report has two sides: the 
significance of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report and the apparent insignificance of the 
Kanpur Riots. What I have argued is that because the riot participants were the subject and 
audience for the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, understanding the Kanpur Riots is central to 
understanding the Congress Report. The Report’s creation in 1931 came at a time when a 
number of religious riots were affecting India. The authors sought to explain the violence in 
terms that did not call upon colonial formulations about Indians but rather extended the blame to 
the colonial state. To that end, they crafted a framework explaining Hindu-Muslim relations in 
terms that overturned British justifications for imperial rule. Their intent to “expose the methods 
by which our [Indian] history has been deliberately misinterpreted and misrepresented” evolved 
into the creation of a framework that would be invoked in nationalist histories from the time the 
report was published in the 1930s until as recently as 2006.
312
 
 Because the Report has become increasingly famous-evidenced by the number of 
secondary sources that call upon its findings- I chose to resolve the paradox by focusing on riot 
observers. Chapter Two and Three brought the Kanpur Riots to the forefront of the controversy 
surrounding the Report. I have argued that the Kanpur Riots were important to an understanding 
of the Report because they allowed the authors to evidence and put forth their claims in the 
words of riot participants. The voices of ordinary citizens of Kanpur, unaffiliated with either the 
Congress Party or the British Government, provided an in-depth look at an instance of Hindu-
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Muslim strife from the perspective of those involved. While fascinating in themselves, two facets 
of witness testimonies were particularly striking. First, some citizens disagreed with the claims 
of the Congress Party and second, their testimonies were qualified with editorial remarks that 
attempted to minimize the impact of the witness’ statement. The witnesses cited in the Report 
pointed to sectarian mobilization as a cause for strife while the Congress Party members quoted 
in Maulana Zaraful-Mulk’s “Note of Dissent” openly contested the depiction of Congress 
workers presented in the text of the Report. While not wholly refuting the claims of the Kanpur 
Riot Commission Report, they did mar the reputation of the Congress Party. Riot participants’ 
voices revealed an inconsistency between the claims made by the authors of the Report and the 
actions of Congress Party members during the riots.  
 One final note needs to be added. My thesis revolved around the Kanpur Riot 
Commission Report; specifically, the way the authors of the Report used the words of riot 
participants. What is important to note is that the Report allows for the type of criticisms I have 
charged it with precisely because they included the voices of the riot observers.  Crafting an 
equitable narrative is an impossible task and the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report 
did attempt to represent the people, a task the colonial state did not bother to undertake in their 
analysis of the Kanpur Riots. The fact that the authors of the Report did assume this monumental 
task is as enriching today as it was in 1931. It showed how nationalists viewed their past and the 
Congress Party’s role in the mid-twentieth century. Their contribution to nationalist 
historiography was monumental and their writings about riot participants give way to more 
varied perceptions of the Congress Party. The Kanpur Riot Commission Report illuminates the 
state of Hindu-Muslim relations as the authors viewed it in 1931 and today, can be viewed as a 
lens for understanding how a central framework of nationalist historiography was formulated.  
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APPENDIX I: IMAGES OF THE KANPUR RIOTS 
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Photographs from The Leader, April 11, 1931 
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Photographs from The Leader, April 19, 1931 
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APPENDIX II: MAPS 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Location of Kanpur, India 
 
 
 
 
 
                        Source: http://wwp.greenwichmeantime.com/time-zone/asia/india/kanpur/map.htm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
105 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Map of Cawnpore District, 1893 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Constable's 1893 Hand Atlas to India: A new series of sixty maps and plans prepared from ordinances and 
other surveys. Westminister, Constable, 1893.  
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